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Abstract 
 
Strid, Karin (2007). Memory, attention and interaction in early development: Exploring 
individual differences among typical children and children with autism. Department of 
Psychology, Göteborg University, Sweden. 
 
This thesis aimed to study differences in early memory ability, social attention and interaction 
and how these different areas affect language and cognitive development. This was done 
using a longitudinal approach where a group of children were followed from infancy to 
childhood and also in a comparative study where a group of children diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder was compared to a group of typically developing children, matched on 
language age. Study I investigated typically developing infants and showed that recall 
memory (measured with deferred imitation), visual recognition memory and social 
communicative ability could explain a large part of the differences in early language 
acquisition, and also that recall memory made the strongest contribution to this explanation. 
Study II was a follow-up of the same children as in study I, and showed that a combined low 
performance on tests of both recall memory and social communication in infancy was related 
to poorer cognitive outcome beyond infancy, when the children had reached 4 years of age. In 
study III, deferred imitation and different aspects of social communication were investigated 
in children with autism and in comparison with typically developing children. The results 
revealed that children with autism and low language level showed reduced performance in all 
areas of social communication as well as on deferred imitation. Children with autism and a 
higher language level, however, performed on a similar level as the typically developing 
children on all but one measure of social communication, but they still showed reduced 
performance on deferred imitation. Study IV included the same children as study III, and their 
performance on pretend play as well as child-parents interaction during play was investigated 
in relation to language level, joint attention and deferred imitation. Pretend play was related to 
the child’s language level, joint attention and deferred imitation. The way parents interacted 
verbally with their child differed between parents of children with autism compared to parents 
of typically developing children, but also on the child’s language level.  
The present thesis suggests that it is beneficial to investigate social and cognitive areas in 
combination if the aim is to understand how early abilities affect later development. The 
results contribute to the understanding of language development in autism and also point to 
the importance of considering the child’s developmental level. Children with autism showed 
large individual differences in many different areas, and the results suggest that this was 
partly due to the child’s language level. 
Keywords: Memory, social communication, interaction, individual differences, autism 
spectrum disorder, language development 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human infants are born with an interest and a motivation to socially connect to other people. 
They also possess the basic cognitive skills that make this early interaction possible. The 
cognitive and social growth that follows birth is impressive and not comparable to any other 
period in life, and by the end of infancy many advanced forms of social and cognitive abilities 
have found their basic forms. The child has by then begun to understand intentions of others, 
create symbols, understand goal-directed actions and has access to advanced memory 
processes. When the ultimate tool for social interaction – spoken language – is acquired, the 
basic structures for communication have already been functioning for quite some time.  
 
Empirical data from the last 40 years has revealed a highly competent infant, and most 
theorists today agree that infants start out with a richer innate capacity than what was 
proposed by classic developmental theories of human development. However, there are 
different opinions on how competent and how conscious infants really are. While some argue 
that a lot of knowledge, or knowledge structures, are innate, others argue that knowledge 
mainly develops through experience; a discrepancy that partly mirrors the classic 
nature/nurture debate in developmental psychology. To separate innate abilities from those 
that are acquired, and to understand how early predictors affect later development, is not easy. 
Since infants are nonverbal, all infancy research depends on behaviours which are possible to 
observe, and the interpretation of these behaviours. This means that research only involves 
implicit measures, which makes infancy research sensitive to, and dependent on, 
methodology.  
 
Children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder have difficulties in areas of social 
interaction and communication, even if individuals differ widely in the degree of impairment. 
While some children with autism are socially withdrawn and might never develop spoken 
language, others are more interested in social interaction even if they find it difficult, and 
some even acquire good verbal skills. Children with autism are also impaired in some of the 
important skills that typical children develop in infancy, even if the degree, cause and 
consequence of these impairments is not fully understood.  
 
This thesis investigates individual differences in social and cognitive abilities in relation to 
language and cognitive development, both in typically developing children and in children 
diagnosed with autism. The challenge is to better understand which abilities that underpins 
language and cognition, and how the developmental process that leads from early to later 
abilities works. 
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Infant development 
The field of infant development has changed dramatically over the last 40 years. The 
vulnerability and the lack of motoric competence in infants led developmental psychologists 
to the conclusion that the earliest part of our lives was characterized by no self-awareness and 
no consciousness, and was described as a period of mental isolation. This view begun to 
change when Piaget introduced his theory of early cognitive development (Piaget, 1952). 
Piaget showed that infants are active in exploring their environment and that they have access 
to cognitive processes much more complex than previously believed. Despite this, Piaget 
turned out to have underestimated infant capacities. In the 70s, the development of new 
methodologies made it possible to reveal more advanced abilities at earlier ages. Where older 
methods often depended on motoric competence and required action from the infant, new 
ones were based on looking preference and habituation/dishabituation. 
 
Competing theories of early development 
Many of the new findings of infant competence cannot be explained by classic developmental 
theories but require a new theoretical framework. Alternative theories have emerged in the 
search for such a framework, and three competing theories are the theory-theory, the 
modularity theory and the simulation theory. These have different ways of explaining the 
early capacities in infancy and also how these capacities develop into more sophisticated 
abilities. 
Theory-theory 
From a theory-theory point of view, cognitive development in children is similar to theory 
development in science (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Children start out with immature 
theories, and use these theories to make sense of the world. When new data, through 
experience, no longer can be explained or predicted, the child’s theory in that domain will 
change. As in science, children use their theories to understand the world, make predictions 
and explain what they experience (Meltzoff, 1999; Wellman, 2004). When the theory 
eventually does not work any more for the child, it is revised and replaced with a better, more 
accurate theory. Development can thus be viewed as a kind of testing of hypotheses, much in 
the same way as scientists test their theories (Gopnik, 2003). However, children do not use 
scientific thinking when they make predictions about the world, the kind of theories that 
children have should be seen more as informal theories. The theory-theory aims at explaining 
how children develop their understanding of both the physical and the social world. The 
theory also suggests that we understand ourselves and our own behaviour much in the same 
way as we learn to understand others. It is not easier to understand, for example, our own 
beliefs than the beliefs of others (Wellman, 2004). The theory also suggests that 
developmental change is a result of children being exposed to external stimuli and not of 
internal development (Hala & Carpendale, 1997). 
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Meltzoff (2005; 2007) suggests that infants have an innate mechanism that makes them 
recognise other people as “like me”. This “like-me” mechanism is evident in infant imitation 
and constitutes an innate ability to understand the behaviour of other people and also to begin 
to create theories about the social world and others’ mental states (Meltzoff, 2007). When 
infants observe others’ behaviour they can map this to how they are thinking or feeling when 
they behave in a similar way, which gives infants a “jump-start” in their ability to understand 
others (Meltzoff, 2004b). Thus, theory-theory suggests that infants are born with initial 
theories and that they start to revise these theories as a result of their first experiences 
(Gopnik, 2003). One strength of this account is thus that it can explain both early infant 
competence as well as the developmental change that takes place during infancy (Wellman, 
2004). 
Modularity theory 
A different explanation of early development is given by modularity theorists (Fodor, 1992; 
Leslie, 1991). Modular theory postulates that the maturation of innate neurocognitive 
structures, modules, is responsible for early development. These modules are domain-specific, 
which means that different aspects of development are independent of each other (Scholl & 
Leslie, 1999). It also means that one specific module can be selectively impaired, by e.g. 
neurological damage.  
 
Baron-Cohen (1995a; Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994) argues that infants’ understanding of both 
dyadic and triadic interactions develop through domain-specific, modular mechanisms. One 
mechanism, the Eye-direction-detector makes the child aware of others’ gaze, both directed at 
the child itself and at other things. This understanding of gaze is necessary in order to form 
dyadic interactions. A different mechanism makes triadic interactions possible; the Shared-
attention-mechanism. The function of the Shared-attention-mechanism is to recognise that 
you and another person is attending to the same object or event (Baron-Cohen, 1995a).   
 
The modular theory can easily explain the new findings of infant competence, since these are 
assumed to be innate. However, the theory has more difficulties explaining the qualitative 
change in development (Meltzoff, 1999; Wellman, 2004). 
Simulation theory 
Simulation theory argues that early development occurs through processes of mental 
simulation (Goldman, 1992; Harris, 1991; 1994). Children do not need to create theories 
about the world or the people in it, all they need is to understand themselves. Simulation 
theorists argue that we have privileged access to our own mental states and that we, trough a 
simulation process, can put ourselves in the situation of others (Hala & Carpendale, 1997). 
We can imagine what we would do or feel if we were in that situation and attribute those 
actions or feelings to the other person, through a kind of role-taking. The importance of 
imagination has made simulation theorists focus on pretend play as an early important skill 
(e.g. Harris, 1991) and its development is also seen as evidence that young children can step 
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outside themselves and pretend to be someone else. Developmentally, children learn to make 
more accurate simulations as they get more experienced in role-taking and develop their 
imaginative capacity (Wellman, 2004). 
 
Simulation theory can explain many of the early social abilities in infants. For example, if 
infants understand that they point at an object with the intention of sharing an experience with 
another person, they also understand the intention behind pointing gestures of others. 
However, critics of the simulation theory emphasise that young children often find it as 
difficult to understand their own mental states as it is understanding the mental states of 
others. This would suggest that we do not have privileged access to mental states just because 
they are our own (Gopnik, 1993), an assumption  that is the major building-block of 
simulation theory.  
 
Understanding the physical world 
Infants can only understand what they can perceive, and a better understanding of infant 
perception has also made it possible to gain more knowledge about early cognitive 
development. The fact that infants prefer certain information to other, shows that they choose 
what they attend to and also that they distinguish between available information (e.g. Maurer, 
1985). Infants also look longer at information that is new to them (e.g. Fagan, 1970), which 
means that we can create experiments to find out when information is considered new to 
infants. This has expanded our knowledge about what infants can discriminate, how long it 
takes them to process information, and how long they remember.  
 
Piaget’s general claim was that infants develop through their sensorimotor interaction with 
physical objects. They learn about the world through exploring objects and they have to 
physically manipulate objects in order to understand them. This means that they were not 
thought to be able to create representations of actions and objects but depended on the world 
here and now. However, newer research (see Muir & Slater, 2000) has revealed that infants 
have cognitive capacities more advanced than Piaget proposed, especially if the motoric 
demands are lifted from the cognitive tasks. For example, object permanence, the 
understanding that objects have their own existence in the world separated from the infant’s 
view of it, was not thought to develop before the age of eight months in classic developmental 
theory. Piaget concluded that infants had only developed object permanence when they 
started to reach for hidden objects. If they did not, it was interpreted as if they did not 
understand that the hidden object continued to exist when it was not seen. More recent 
research has shown that the motor demands of the task was too difficult and masked the 
infant’s cognitive competence. When using a looking paradigm, object permanence tasks are 
passed by infants as young as three to four months (e.g. Baillargeon, 1999). In a series of 
studies, Baillargeon (2000) has demonstrated that infants are surprised (shown by increased 
looking time) when they see a screen move through another (hidden) object. This is 
interpreted as if the infants know that the object behind the screen exists, even if it cannot be 
seen. Thus, infants show an understanding of object permanence earlier in life when the test 
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does not require any motoric action. This means that infants develop an understanding of the 
physical world much earlier than previously proposed and, more importantly, this 
development does not seem to require object manipulation. 
 
Using the same methodology, infants at four months show some basic understanding of 
gravity and they also know that one object cannot move through another object (Spelke, 
Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). They also have some early basic understanding 
of causality, e.g. if object A moves towards object B, and they make physical contact, object 
A causes object B to move. Already by two to three months, infants understand that this 
causal relation is violated if a barrier is present between the objects (Baillargeon, 2000). This 
develops further and by six months can infants also take into consideration that a small object 
has a smaller effect on an other object than a large object has (Baillargeon, 2000).  
 
Studies of infant perception has revealed that infants prefer human voices (e.g. Vouloumanos 
& Werker, 2004) and human faces (e.g. Maurer & Barrera, 1981) to other kinds of sounds and 
objects. This means that they can both differentiate between animate and inanimate objects 
and that they choose one over the other. In the first months of life, infants cannot only 
distinguish between different faces and different expressions in the human face (Nelson, 
1987), they also show a preference for their mothers’ face (Bushnell, 2001). Thus, other 
people seem to constitute a very special kind of “objects” for humans already in the beginning 
of life: 
 
 “In their second month after birth their reactions to things and persons are so different 
that we must conclude that these two classes of objects are distinct in the infant’s 
awareness” (Trevarthen, 1979, p. 322). 
Disagreements 
Most researchers agree on what young infants understand of the physical world around them, 
but there are disagreements about how this should be interpreted and how this understanding 
has developed. The nativist side interprets these findings as evidence for e.g. innate 
representational ability and innate knowledge of continuity (Spelke, 1998, 1999) while the 
empiricist side means that this understanding develops through children’s exploration of 
objects (Haith, 1998; Piaget, 1952). Other researchers stand somewhere between these 
positions and their general suggestion is that some knowledge or knowledge structure is 
innate, while other aspects are learned (e.g. Meltzoff, 2004b). The research results on 
causality, for example, can be interpreted as infants having an initial understanding about 
causal relations, but requiring experience about objects in order to understand how size and 
length matter to causality (Baillargeon, 2000). 
 
There is a similar nature/nurture debate about early face recognition. One side argues that face 
recognition depends on the experience of human faces (e.g. Nelson, 2001) while the other 
side argues that this ability is already well developed at birth (e.g. Slater & Quinn, 2001). 
Following the later argument; early face recognition, and especially neonatal imitation of 
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facial expressions, has been suggested as evidence that human beings are pre-programmed for 
social activities and have an innate motivation and ability to communicate and interact with 
other people (Hobson, 2004; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001).   
 
Understanding the social world 
When observing mothers and infants interacting, the reciprocal atmosphere of that interaction 
is obvious. The mother and infant use gaze and imitation to create an affective and rhythmic 
situation, which has many similarities with adult conversation and has also been called proto-
conversational (Bateson, 1979). The term primary intersubjectivity refers to the proposed 
innate ability and motivation in the human infant that makes mutual interaction possible 
(Trevarthen, 1979; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). This means that human infants are born 
specifically receptive to the subjective states of other persons. Mother and infant are not only 
looking and smiling at each other, but modifying their behaviour in response to what the other 
person does, that is, the interaction is reciprocal. Even if there is data (e.g. Nadel, Carchon, 
Kervella, Marcelli, & Reserbat-Plantey, 1999) showing that infants are active participants in 
early social interactions – such as having expectations on the adult, detecting contingencies 
and responding to the social partner – some (e.g. Gergely & Watson, 1999) are still sceptical 
about the infants’ consciousness of the social and communicative aspects of this dyadic 
interaction.  
Dyadic interaction 
The interaction between a mother and her infant is characterized by rhythm and intimacy 
(Zeedyk, 2006). Phases of face-to-face interactions are encouraged by the mother through 
smiles and increased gaze in such a way that they are prolonged (Trevarthen, 1979). Infants 
are active partners in this interaction and are sensitive to the contingency and quality of the 
interaction. They react with distress if the mother is not tuned in to the rhythm of the 
“conversation” and has already created predictive patterns of interaction and expectancies of a 
specific behaviour from the mother.  
 
This social expectancy is shown in experiments using the still-face paradigm (Tronick, Als, & 
Adamson, 1979). These experiments show that infants as young as two months react with 
strong negative emotions when their mother shows a still face (Adamson & Frick, 2003). 
They typically try to get the mother to respond by looking more at her and maybe smile more, 
but when there is no reaction they give up and turn away from the mother, both with their 
eyes, face and body. The infants’ reaction in this still-face situation is interpreted as if the 
infant has social expectancies of the interaction and responds with distress when these 
expectancies are not fulfilled (Ellsworth, Muir, & Hains, 1993; Nadel et al., 2000; Nadel & 
Tremblay-Leveau, 1999). 
  
Infants do not respond with distress merely to another persons’ inactivity or 
unresponsiveness, but also when interaction is out of tune. This is shown in an experimental 
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situation using the “double-video-technique”, where the natural interaction is disturbed (e.g. 
Braarud & Stormark, 2006; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Nadel et al., 1999). In these studies, 
infants and mothers are interacting via a screen (the mother sees the infant on a screen and the 
infant sees the mother on a screen). When the video recording is live, ordinary interaction is 
present. But if the mother is recorded and her responses are shown to the infant with a thirty 
seconds delay, the infant shows negative affect and is disturbed by the lack of contingency of 
the mother (Hains & Muir, 1996; Murray & Trevarthen, 1985). This is taken as evidence that 
the infant is not simply responding to a positive and active adult, but is also sensitive to the 
contingency of the interaction and reacts when this is broken (Nadel et al., 2000). 
 
Apart from the sensitivity of the typically developing infant, the sensitivity of the mother is 
equally important. Observations of clinically depressed mothers highlight the importance of 
having a sensitive and responsive social partner to interact with and also point to the fact that 
it is the dyadic pattern of early interaction that is important. Postnatal depression leads to 
reduced or slower responses to infants’ social cues and vocalizations (Bettes, 1988; Field, 
2002) and this lack of a normal mother-infant interaction pattern affects both the infants’ 
behaviour (Field, 2002) and brain activity (Field, Pickens, Fox, & Newrocki, 1995) as well as 
their social and emotional development (Field, Diego, & Hernandez-Reif, 2006).  
 
The discovery of an innate ability and motivation to imitate facial gestures in neonatal human 
infants (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) has been taken as another evidence for primary 
intersubjectivity in infants. The imitative behaviour shows that infants respond in an adaptive 
way already from the first hours in life, which suggests that humans are born with a 
willingness and motivation to interact socially with others (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). 
Infants also imitate emotional facial expressions (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 
1982; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987) suggesting that humans have an early ability to emotionally 
connect to other people, detect and respond to emotions in others and, probably, learn about 
their own emotions through the emotions of other people (Hobson, 2004). 
 
The pattern of early dyadic interaction is often characterized by turn-taking sequences, which 
continues in later triadic interaction as well as in adult conversation. This shows an innate, or 
early emerging, non-verbal communicative skill in infants to coordinate their attention with 
another person. Triadic turn-taking refers to situations where two people are engaged in 
taking turns and in infancy this often occurs in playing with objects, like throwing a ball back 
and fourth. These situations help the infant to understand the framework in which 
communication takes place between two people (Hobson, 2004). Very early, infants are also 
capable of vocal turn-taking with their mothers in which they make sounds and then are quiet 
while the other person speaks (Locke, 1995). Turn-taking – both vocal and with objects – 
could be seen as a nonverbal precursor for vocal dialogue.  
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Triadic interaction 
A few months before their first birthday, infants begin to include objects in their interaction 
with others, combining the awareness of both objects and persons into a new form of self- 
person-object awareness. This has been termed secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen & 
Hubley, 1978) and signs of this new ability are infants’ use of communicative gestures that 
refer to objects, such as pointing and gaze following. Before this stage of development, the 
infant relates to objects or persons. It is only when they can combine objects and people that 
infants begin to notice how other people interact and relate to objects. This ability marks a 
new level of infants’ understanding of other peoples awareness of the world (Hobson, 2004), 
and is of crucial importance for social learning and the development of social cognition. 
Joint attention 
Joint attention occurs when a child and another person attend to the same object or event, and 
they both are aware that this attention is shared (Moore & Dunham, 1995). The capacity for 
joint attention has been proposed as an important precursor to language and social cognition 
and the processes involved in joint attention also provide the child with opportunities for 
social learning (Mundy & Sigman, 2006; Tomasello, 1995) and lay the foundation for more 
complex understanding of the social world (Fonagy, Gergely, & Target, 2007). The ability for 
joint attention probably serves different functions through life and is important both on an 
instrumental and a developmental cognitive level as well as for social motivation:  
 
“periods of joint attention provide an important context for the mutual regulation of 
affect and of problem solving, for the negotiation of communicative intentions, and for 
the sharing of cultural meaning” (Adamson, McArthur, Markov, Dunbar, & Bakeman, 
2001, p. 439) 
 
The earliest sign of the emergence of joint attention capacity is seen when infants start to 
follow another person’s eye-gaze or pointing to objects in the surrounding. A later joint 
attention behaviour has developed when infants start to direct others’ attention to objects they 
find interesting. Another form of joint attention skills is when infants try to modify another 
persons’ behaviour with gestures, for example reaching for an object outside their own reach. 
Researchers sometimes look upon these different acts as separate and define them either as 
behaviours that are responses to somebody else, such as gaze or point following (Morales, 
Mundy, & Rojas, 1998) or behaviour that is initiated by the child, such as pointing or 
reaching (Desrochers, Morissette, & Ricard, 1995).  
 
Gaze and point following. From 6 months of age, infants follow another person’s gaze to 
objects in the surrounding environment (Corkum & Moore, 1998; Morales et al., 1998). This 
behaviour involves a triadic interaction between the infant, the other person and an outside 
object, but the question is if the infant understands the intention behind the other persons’ 
looking. Instead of being driven by their understanding of others’ intentions, it might be that 
infants simply follow where the adult is turning his head, because they have learned that it is 
usually something interesting there to look at. There is an on-going debate regarding how this 
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early gaze-following should be interpreted and if it can be said to reflect true joint attention 
(Corkum & Moore, 1998; Tomasello, 1995). One way of trying to answer this question is to 
have adults turn to an object either with their eyes open or closed (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002). 
If infant gaze- following should be interpreted as joint attention, they have to follow the eyes 
and not only the turning of the head. In the Brooks and Meltzoff study (2002) it was observed 
that infants by the age of 12 months looked at the target if the adult turned to it with open eyes 
but not if the person turned to the target with his eyes closed. However, younger infants have 
been shown to pay more attention to where the head is turning while older infants pay more 
attention to the eyes (Corkum & Moore, 1995) indicating that interpretations of gaze-
following behaviour should be made with caution, at least in younger infants (Morales et al., 
2000).  
 
Gaze- and point-following demonstrates another developmental change in showing that older 
infants become more capable in locating the correct target of someone else’s attention 
(Corkum & Moore, 1995; Delgado, Mundy, Crowson, Markus, & Schwartz, 2002). Before 
their first birthday, infants develop from only being able to locate targets within their own 
visual field (Butterworth, 1995), to also being able to locate targets outside their visual field 
(Butterworth, 2004; Deák, Flom, & Pick, 2000). This change indicates that the same 
underlying social skill (gaze- or point following in this case) manifests itself differently in 
different age groups. 
 
Pointing. Joint attention skills that are initiated by the child (e.g. pointing) develop slightly 
later than behaviours that are responses to others (such as gaze-following). The capacity to 
direct another persons’ gaze to objects of the infants’ own interest develops sometime 
between 9 and 12 months (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Smith & Ulvund, 2003; 
Tomasello, 1995). Infants can use the pointing gesture for different purposes, both for sharing 
attention and for requesting. When infants use imperative pointing the purpose is to change 
the behaviour of the other person, perhaps elicit aid in obtaining an object that is out of reach. 
However, infants can also use the pointing gesture in order to change or influence the others’ 
attention or their goal. Even if these two gestures resemble each other, they have been 
suggested to serve different functions.  
 
Declarative pointing has been suggested to be especially demanding. It has been argued 
(Mundy & Sigman, 2006; Tomasello, 2006) that declarative pointing, in contrast to 
imperative pointing, relies on the understanding of others as mental agents and is driven by a 
motivation to share attention and interest with other persons. In typically developing infants, 
the motivation to share attention and interest is probably strong and declarative gestures are 
common, in contrast to children with social impairments (e.g. Carpenter, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 2002) and primates (e.g. Tomasello, 2006). Critics (e.g. Desrochers et al., 1995) have 
argued that declarative pointing before 12 months is not really used to change the adults 
attention and does not involve the intentional understanding required for true declarative 
pointing. Experiments with 12-month-olds have revealed that the social context is crucial for 
how much the infant points (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004). 
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Only when the adult was active in sharing the infants’ attention to the event the infant pointed 
at, the infants’ pointing increased. Liszkowski et al. (2004) interpreted this result as if the 
infant not only wants to direct the adults attention, but also wants to share this attention. In 
addition to imperative and declarative pointing, infants around 12 months also point simply to 
provide information to someone else (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006). 
This shows that infants can detect what information the adult needs and that they are 
motivated to give that information.  
 
The question of whether initiating and following joint attention are expressions of the same 
underlying mechanism or not is unsolved (Mundy & Gomes, 1998), but there are indications 
that joint attention initiated by the child might predict different capacities compared to 
responding behaviours (Charman et al., 2000; Morales et al., 2000; Mundy & Gomes, 1998; 
Sheinkopf, Mundy, Claussen, & Willoughby, 2004; Ulvund & Smith, 1996).  
Understanding goals and intentions 
An understanding of others’ intentions is well developed when children accomplish “false-
belief” tasks when they are about four years old (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Underpinnings of 
this ability are seen in triadic interactions, but research has also shown intentional 
understanding in other areas such as goal-directed actions, at remarkably early ages (e.g. 
Woodward, 1998). There is research suggesting that infants in their first 6 months understand 
that actions by humans, as well as nonhumans, are driven by goals. Tests of goal-attribution 
have used the looking paradigm, which has revealed that infants increase their looking time 
(i.e. are surprised) when a human action is inconsistent with its goal (Woodward, 1998). 
However, results are contradictory when it comes to the question of whether young infants 
only attribute goals to actions that are performed by humans, or if they make the same 
attribution to actions made by robots (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005; 
Meltzoff, 1995a), or by moving boxes (Kamewari et al., 2005; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). 
That is, if goal-attribution in infancy is specific to humans or not. It can be argued that infants, 
by the time they begin to follow and direct others attention, have acquired some 
understanding of others as intentional agents and that other people act on the basis of their 
own view of the world. Joint attention is an indicator that infants understand that others’ 
perspective of the world can be followed, shared and directed. But other infant behaviour, 
such as selective imitation and goal-attribution, might show an early intentional understanding 
in a more direct way. 
 
Studies have revealed that infants in their second year understand the intention behind an 
action and not only the action they actually observe (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; 
Meltzoff, 1995a). Meltzoff (1995a) showed that 18-month-old infants understood the 
intention behind an action that the adult failed to perform. Instead of imitating the failure, 
they imitated the complete action. Carpenter et al. (1998) showed that 14-month-olds could 
differentiate between intended and accidental actions. Infants did not imitate actions followed 
by a “Whoops!”, but they did imitate actions that were followed by an adult saying “There”. 
In a similar fashion, 9-month-old infants show anger and distress towards an adult who is 
  12 
unwilling to give them a toy, but not towards an adult who is unable to do so (Behne, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), implicating an understanding of others as intentional 
agents. 
Disagreements 
One main disagreement about infants’ understanding of their social world concerns how much 
of their behaviour that should be interpreted as intentional. Researchers mainly agree on what 
infants can and cannot do, but disagree about what mechanisms that underpin the behaviour. 
A variety of perspectives exist concerning the interpretations of the social behaviour seen in 
infants. While some interpret the behaviour as evidence for innate mentalising ability in 
humans, others argue that we interpret infant behaviour as meaningful and conscious much 
more often than what is reasonable. 
 
One area of debate concerns early dyadic interaction and the role of the infant and the parent 
in these interactions. Trevarthen (1979), among others, represent one view in this debate, 
suggesting that infants understand the intention of communication, and by this, understand the 
inner mental states of others and also understand that others’ behaviour is driven by their 
mental states. Other developmental theorists (see Zeedyk, 1996) would not ascribe infants 
with any intentionality at all. Their position is that the mother is responsible for the contingent 
pattern observed in the mother-infant interaction. The infants’ behaviour looks social but it is 
really the mother who interprets her child’s behaviour as meaningful and intentional, and thus 
makes the interaction look reciprocal. Still others (e.g. Gergely & Watson, 1999) are more 
cautious about how much intersubjective awareness we should ascribe to the infant and argue 
that many early abilities, such as proto-conversational turn taking, can be explained without 
giving the infant a mentalising ability or ability to attribute emotional states in others. Even if 
both parent and infant are attuned and like to engage in “conversation”, the reason does not 
have to be that they are subjectively aware of, or share, each others emotional and mental 
states (Fonagy et al., 2007).  
 
An explanation of infant social behaviour that does not involve mentalising abilities is given 
by Gergely (2004). He argues that infants innate interest in human faces and human voices, 
together with their sensibility to contingency, is enough to explain the behaviour of infants in 
early social interaction. For example, it is not necessary to give infants credit for having an 
understanding of others’ intentions because they react with distress when they are faced with 
a broken interaction (as in the still-face-paradigm), since a change in contingency also can 
make infants react in this way (Gergely & Watson, 1999). Gergely (2004) further argues that 
this sensitivity to violation of contingency develops around three months of age. Before that, 
infants are searching for a “perfect” match of their behaviour, like in a mirror (Rochat & 
Morgan, 1995). It is only after three months that infants starts to show an interest in “non-
perfect” matching, as in the case of mother-infant interaction where the mother and the infant 
imitate, take turns and tune in each other, but are not a perfect match of each other. Gergely 
(2004) claims that it has been difficult to replicate studies where infants younger than three 
months show a distressing behaviour in the still-face-test (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985) and 
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that the reason is that such young infants are not yet interested in a non-perfect contingent 
pattern. However, this claim can be questioned since later research has been able to replicate 
the findings of contingent interactions in infants younger than two months (Braarud & 
Stormark, 2006; Nadel et al., 1999). 
 
An assumed innate understanding of others’ intentions has also been criticised by Tomasello 
(1999) who argues that infants begin to understand intentions in others around nine months, 
i.e. when they start to show true joint attention behaviour. Before that age, infants are able to, 
but typically do not, follow the gaze or pointing of others and they do not point at objects 
themselves even if they have the necessary motoric skills to do so. The reason is that before 
nine months infants do not understand or treat others as intentional agents that have goals of 
their own (Tomasello, 1999).  
 
Memory development 
It is difficult to imagine what life would be like without memory, but for a long time this 
ability was assumed to be lacking in infancy. Infants were not thought to have the necessary 
skills for forming personal memories or to recall personal experiences. This view, however, is 
being challenged today. The view on infants as competent and active has increased the 
interest in more direct infancy research and new methods have made it possible to test 
memory in nonverbal groups. 
 
It has been hypothesised that our memory is built on different systems or processes and that 
these processes serve different kinds of memories (for review, see Rovee-Collier, Hayne, & 
Colombo, 2001). One system supports the memory needed for motor skills and habits as when 
we remember how to ride a bicycle. This is the procedural, non-declarative or implicit 
memory system and these kinds of memories are characterized as non-conscious and they 
often benefit from training. A second memory system requires representational ability and 
gives rise to personal or conscious memories, for example when we remember our last 
birthday. This is referred to as the nonprocedural, declarative or explicit memory system. 
Much of the support for the multiple memory system perspective comes from research on 
adults suffering from amnesia. Amnesic patients have severe difficulties in forming personal 
memories but can, at the same time, improve their skills in tasks that require procedural 
memory (Squire, 1987). This indicates that our memory is constructed of two systems 
occupying different parts of the brain, since one can be damaged while the other is unaffected. 
 
The idea of two dissociable memory systems led to the conclusion that these systems also 
have different timetables, where the declarative memory system is supposed to develop later 
than the procedural system (Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1984; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984). 
From birth, infants are only supposed to be capable of forming memories that rely on the 
procedural memory system, not personal memories like adults can. The assumption that 
different memory systems develop at different times relies partly on the phenomenon of 
infantile amnesia, i.e. adults’ difficulties in accessing autobiographical memories before their 
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first years of life (Bauer, Wenner, Dropik, & Wewerka, 2000; Hayne, 2004). The amount of 
memories from early childhood are less than could be expected from normal forgetting, which 
could be explained by the fact that memories formed in infancy are qualitatively different 
from later memories and that the system needed for supporting personal memories is not yet 
developed in infancy (Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1984; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984). The 
assumption of two dissociable memory systems is also effected by the fact that it is very 
difficult to test early signs of declarative memory in a nonverbal population and for a long 
time the task was assumed impossible. Theoretically, this view has been strongly influenced 
by Piaget’s developmental theory. He claimed that the representational capacity necessary for 
forming declarative memories develops at the end of the sensorimotor period, i.e. between 18 
and 24 months. Before children reach this stage, they are not able to form memories of 
specific events (Piaget, 1952). 
 
Later research on early memory development has begun to change the assumption that infants 
lack declarative memory capacity (Bauer, 2004). Evidence today shows that infants do have 
the necessary representational skills for forming declarative memories (Mandler, 1998), and 
they do pass memory tests that are considered equal to verbal declarative memory tests 
(McDonough, Mandler, McKee, & Squire, 1995). Although the phenomenon of infantile 
amnesia remains, later investigators have proposed different explanations to it. It does not 
seem to be a result of infants’ inability to form declarative memories, but rather a problem of 
accessibility (e.g. Rovee-Collier, 2000; Simcock & Hayne, 2002). The focus in infant 
memory research has changed from investigating what adults remember from their infancy to 
investigating memory in infants. This has led to suggestions that both memory systems (if it is 
possible to talk about two systems) are present – in some form – early in life and, 
consequently, that infants have the capacity to construct declarative memories (Rovee-Collier 
et al., 2001). Especially the use of new methods to test infant memory has increased the 
understanding of memory capacity in infancy, which has forced older theories about memory 
development to be reconsidered (Courage & Howe, 2004; Fagan & Detterman, 1992; 
Meltzoff, 2004a). 
 
Testing declarative memory in preverbal infants demands specific methodologies (e.g. Hayne, 
2004) and two of the most common tests are described below. One relies on the imitative 
capacity in infants’ and the other uses infants’ preference for novelty. Both tests are most 
commonly considered to measure preverbal declarative memory; recall memory and 
recognition memory. It has, however, been suggested that these two memory tests capture 
different memory processes (i.e. declarative and procedural processes) (Gross, Hayne, 
Herbert, & Sowerby, 2001; Rose, Feldman, & Jankowski, 2004) 
Deferred imitation 
Piaget was first in recognising the importance of deferred imitation in cognitive development. 
He emphasized that the child’s ability to imitate after a delay showed that the child had begun 
to create mental representations and could act according to stored representations (Piaget, 
1962). Classically, the capacity for recall memory was assumed to develop after the 
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sensorimotor period in infancy, at the end of the second year. This assumption was first 
revised when results were presented showing that 14-month-olds (Meltzoff, 1985) and 9-
month-olds (Meltzoff, 1988b) were able to imitate after delay. Research has also found 
individual stability (Heimann & Meltzoff, 1996) where infants with low performance on 
deferred imitation at 9 months also performed low at 14 months. Today, research has shown 
that infants already at the age of 6 months pass the same deferred imitation test (Barr, 
Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Collie & Hayne, 1999; Hayne, Boniface, & Barr, 2000; Heimann & 
Nilheim, 2004; Learmonth, Lamberth, & Rovee-Collier, 2004) and that recall memory is a 
continuously developing ability; infants at 6 months remember fewer items, fewer details and 
for a shorter period of time, compared to older infants (Jones & Herbert, 2006). 
 
Imitation of actions with objects is used in the classic deferred imitation procedure (Meltzoff, 
1985). In this procedure infants are presented with different objects and an experimenter 
performs specific actions on them. The infant is not allowed to handle the object, instead the 
object is removed and a delay is imposed. After the delay, the infant is offered the object and 
during a specific response time he or she is given the opportunity to handle the toys to 
produce the same action. Since the infants are only exposed to a brief action demonstration 
and are not allowed to handle the object prior to the test, it is commonly assumed that the 
memory used is of a more mature form (i.e. a declarative recall memory) than in other 
nonverbal memory tests (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993; Meltzoff, 1995b). To be sure that 
the infant has not seen the demonstrated action in their every day life, studies usually include 
novel actions. In a seminal paper by Meltzoff (1988a) the experimenter had a panel of lights 
in front of him, bended forwards and touched the panel with his forehead, which made a light 
turn on. This action was completely novel to the infant and yet 67% of the 14-month-old 
infants who saw the action imitated after a one-week delay. A control group who did not see 
the action demonstrated had a 0% correct response showing that this is not an action that 
infants do spontaneously. This strengthens the assumption that infants can remember things 
they have only briefly been exposed to and that memory in this task is based on representation 
since the children have no prior motor practice of the action (Meltzoff, 2004a).  
Developmental change 
As described above, deferred imitation of actions with objects is possible to observe in infants 
from at least the age of 6 months. Deferred imitation, however, is an ability that changes as a 
function of age. Encoding, storing and retrieval within the deferred imitation paradigm is 
dependent on maturation and clear developmental changes can be observed. 
 
When testing 9- and 14-month-olds the action demonstrated is typically presented three times 
to the infant. The first study that demonstrated the onset of deferred imitation at a lower age 
(Barr et al., 1996) showed that infants by the age of 6 months were able to imitate actions 
after a 24 hour delay, but only if they were exposed to the target action six times instead of 
three, which indicates that older infants learn faster than younger infants.  
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Memory flexibility also changes with age. Hayne et al. (2000) have reported that 6-month-
olds do not imitate an action they have seen demonstrated in one context if the test session 
occurs in a different context, while this change has no effect on the 12-month-olds (Klein & 
Meltzoff, 1999). The Hayne et al. study (2000) also showed that both 6- and 12-month-old 
infants were disrupted in imitation when the object was changed (to a different puppet) but a 
change of object had no effect on the 18-month-olds. 18-month-old toddlers are also capable 
of deferred imitation when the demonstration has only been seen on television (Barr & 
Hayne, 1999), but this is not enough for the 12- and 15-month-olds. 14-month-olds have been 
shown to be unaffected in imitation when both the room and the object size are changed 
(Barnat, Klein, & Meltzoff, 1996) although a decrease in performance was noted when both 
room, size of object and colour of object were changed.  
 
A developmental change is also evident when comparing the length of time possible between 
demonstration and testing; 6- and 9-month-olds can remember actions for 24 hours (Collie & 
Hayne, 1999; Hayne et al., 2000), while 12-month-olds can remember up to 4 weeks (Klein & 
Meltzoff, 1999) and 14-month-olds up to 4 months (Meltzoff, 1995b).  
 
The deferred imitation paradigm has been used to measure recall memory even before 6 
months. If the deferred imitation task includes a facial gesture instead of actions with objects, 
deferred imitation is evident in infants already at six weeks, and for as long as 24 hours 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1994). This task does not require any motoric demands and it includes a 
known action (such as mouth opening) instead of a new event but still shows that infants have 
the capacity to remember and act on stored representations at the very beginning of life. 
Another study showed that infants can remember an action seen at three months, and imitate 
that action at six months (Campanella & Rovee-Collier, 2005). When the infants were three 
months old they saw two objects together repeatedly, creating an association between them. 
The infants then saw an action demonstrated on one of the objects (A) and were at this time 
not yet motorically capable of performing the action themselves. At six months, the infants 
could use this latent association and imitated the action they had seen demonstrated on object 
A, on object B. That is, the memory and association that were created at three months could 
be used three months later. Infants who had not seen the objects together at three months (and 
thus did not form an association between them), did not imitate the action on a different 
puppet (Campanella & Rovee-Collier, 2005). 
Deferred imitation as a measure of declarative memory 
The characteristics outlined above are considered as evidence that deferred imitation is a 
measure of declarative memory and comparable to adult tests of verbal recall (McDonough et 
al., 1995). The procedure used shows that infants can remember representations across 
modalities as well as other changes (Bauer et al., 2000), which is required in declarative 
memory tests. The target action is seen briefly and there is no possibility of training since the 
infant is not even allowed to touch the object prior to testing, which means that the memory is 
from a representation of an action rather than a motor skill learned by training. Another strong 
piece of evidence that deferred imitation taps declarative memory processes is the fact that 
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amnesic patients who evidently have limited declarative memory do very poorly on deferred 
imitation tests (McDonough et al., 1995). Deferred imitation is also considered to measure 
recall memory rather than recognition because when the action has been demonstrated there is 
no evidence of that action, which means that it has to be recalled. The fact that some deferred 
imitation tests use multi-step sequences strengthen the idea that it is a recall memory test 
(Bauer, 2004). 
Visual recognition memory 
Another nonverbal memory test that can be used in infancy is the paired-comparison test 
(Fagan & Detterman, 1992), which measures the infants’ visual recognition memory. This test 
exploits the fact that infants show a preference for novelty (Fagan, 1984), a fundamental 
capacity throughout life. At least from two months of age, infants pay more attention to 
information that is new to them compared to familiar information; they show a preference for 
novel information (for a review see; Bahrick & Pickens, 1995). This means that when infants 
differ in their fixation time between a novel and a previously seen target, they are assumed to 
remember the target they devote the least fixation to. When infants turn their attention away 
from the familiar picture they are assumed to have formed a representation of that stimuli 
(Rose et al., 2004), and it is this representation that they remember and use in the later 
comparison. 
 
Tests of infants’ visual recognition memory is based on individual processing speed (Fagan & 
Haiken-Vasen, 1997; Rose et al., 2004), which could partly explain individual differences in 
recognition memory tasks. Different studies (see Sigman, Cohen, & Beckwith, 1997) have 
shown that some infants need to look longer at a target, compared to other infants, before they 
reach the point where they demonstrate a preference for novelty. This difference is 
particularly evident in at-risk infants (e.g. preterm) who need longer time to encode 
information and also improve their novelty score when the familiarization time is increased 
(Rose et al., 2004). 
Paired-comparison procedure 
In one test of visual recognition memory (Fagan & Detterman, 1992) the infant sees two 
pictures of faces side by side on a computer screen. These pictures are shown for 10-20 sec. 
depending on the age of the infant being tested, since younger infants needs longer exposure 
time than older infants (Fagan & Detterman, 1992). After the familiarization period one of the 
pictures is shown together with a novel picture, and an experimenter records which picture the 
infant has focused his/hers attention to. The experimenter stands behind the computer and 
hidden by a screen so he can see the child’s eyes while still avoiding to distract the child. 
Half-way through the test, the pictures left and right positions are changed, in order to control 
for side effects. This procedure is repeated by combining different pairs of novel and familiar 
faces. The measure that is primarily given is a novelty score (in percent) showing how much 
longer the infant looks at the novel pictures compared to the familiar ones, a score that usually 
falls between 57 and 60% in typically developing infants (Fagan & Detterman, 1992).  
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Predictions 
Predictions from visual recognition memory have been made to different cognitive outcomes 
later in childhood in a number of different studies (McCall & Carriger, 1993; Moe & Smith, 
2003; Rose, Feldman, & Wallace, 1992; Smith, Fagan, & Ulvund, 2002). McCall & Carriger 
(1993) found in their meta-analysis an average correlation of .45 between tests of visual 
recognition memory in infancy and developmental level at 2 to 8 years. One suggested 
explanation for this stability is that the processing skill used in tests of visual recognition by 
infants is the same skill that children or adults use to solve problems in intelligence tests 
(Fagan, 2000; Fagan & Haiken-Vasen, 1997). Accordingly, these infants, who are better in 
processing information, will also gain more knowledge through life and consequently score 
better on later IQ tests. Another explanation could be that infants differ in their ability to 
recognise unimportant information, i.e. they rapidly turn away from familiar information. If 
they only need short familiarization time and then turn their attention towards new 
information they could also be better at detecting the most informative information in the 
environment (Sigman et al., 1997), an important ability in later IQ tests. 
 
Play 
In the first months of life, infants start to engage in sensory play, where they explore the 
environment through their senses (sight, sound, smell, touch and taste) (Piaget, 1962). 
Children also start to engage in functional play in the first year of life, where toys or other 
objects are used in the function they have. In the second year of life, symbolic, or pretend, 
play begins to emerge (e.g. Lillard, 2004; McCune, 1995). Pretend play is usually defined as 
acting as if something is the case when it is really not (Leslie, 1987).  
Pretend play 
The difference between functional and pretend play is not entirely clear, mainly because it is 
difficult to know when a play act should be considered symbolic or not (Jarrold, Boucher, & 
Smith, 1993). For example, when a child is playing with toy cars it is not certain that he/she 
understands that the toy cars are symbols of real cars; they may simply be perceived as small, 
real objects (Baron-Cohen, 1987) and the situation should therefore be defined as functional 
play. Because different researchers use slightly different definitions, some results are difficult 
to compare.  
 
Piaget (1962) was the first researcher showing interest in children’s ability to pretend. He saw 
this symbolic competence as a cognitive ability, paying very little attention to the social 
context in which the play occurred. In contrast, Vygotskij (1978) meant that symbolic 
thinking develops within the child’s social context and in interaction with others. This classic 
distinction in play theory still exists today; is symbolic thinking a result of cognitive 
maturation in the child, or is it created and learned in interaction with others?  
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One line of theory emphasizes the fact that development of pretend play requires an 
understanding of metarepresentation (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Leslie, 1987). When the child is 
using one object as if it was something else, he/she has to hold the real representations in 
mind at the same time as the pretended representation, i.e. a representation of a representation. 
Others argue that metarepresentation is not necessary for pretend play (Harris, 1994). Instead, 
the child only needs to be able to imagine what things could be like, and then pretend that 
they are. This does not require metarepresentation, but the child needs to be able to think 
hypothetically (Harris, 1994). 
 
Another line of research emphasizes the social nature of pretend play and suggests that 
pretend play, as well as functional play, develops through imitative/cultural learning 
(Rakoczy, 2006; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2005). To imitate a pretend action is more 
difficult than to imitate a functional action, because the other persons’ intention behind the 
action is more complex and more difficult to understand. For example, when the child sees 
another person acting as if a piece of wood is a car, the child has to be able to understand that 
the other persons’ intention is to use the wood as a car, and then imitate that action. It is by 
observing others that children learn the culturally accepted way to use and create symbols, 
both in pretend play development, but also in the acquisition of language (Tomasello, 1999). 
Additionally, the ability to engage in pretend play with others provides the child with 
opportunities to practice social roles and also constructs a context where symbols are created 
and used (Travis & Sigman, 1998).  
 
Many observations support the importance of social interaction in the development of pretend 
play. Results show that pretend play increases if the child plays with a parent instead of 
playing alone (Bornstein & Tamis-LeMonda, 1995; Fein & Fryer, 1995). In one experiment, 
the mother was either asked to play with her child in the usual way, or to sit near the child but 
occupied with filling out a form and talking to the experimenter. The experiment showed that 
both the level and the length of pretend play increased when the mother was available to play 
with the child (Slade, 1987). Another experiment compared children’s social behaviour in 
different forms of play and found that the children looked more at the adult during pretend 
play as compared to instrumental play (Striano, Tomasello, & Rochat, 2001).  
 
Another support for the importance of social interaction in pretend play is its strong relation 
to language development (for a review see; Lewis, 2003). Even if a child’s functional play 
level has been related to the language level (e.g. Ungerer & Sigman, 1984) the strongest 
relation is found between language and pretend play (Lewis, Boucher, Lupton, & Watson, 
2000; Tamis-LeMonda & Bornstein, 1994). For example, Lewis et al. (2000) found positive 
correlations between pretend play and both production and comprehension of language (.47 
and .35, respectively). This could indicate that both pretend play and language depend on the 
development of symbolic understanding in children. 
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Language 
The ultimate tool of social interaction and understanding is language and when a child learns 
to use language a new world of social opportunities opens. However, exchanging verbal 
information is not the only ingredient in communication. When we are engaged in 
conversation it includes interpretation of what is really being said, looking at facial 
expressions and gestures that accompany language, listening to what is not being expressed 
verbally and putting the conversation into context (what I know about the persons history, 
experiences and personality).  
 
Some of the important communicative skills that infants develop before they master language 
have been described above. Gestures involved in the social interactions of joint attention 
episodes, such as pointing, soon become accompanied by sounds, sounds that later become 
words. Around the time of their first birthday most children have produced their first word, 
but typically infants comprehend several words before they have the ability to produce any 
themselves, and this is generally the case even when children grow older (Flavell et al., 1993). 
After the appearance of the first word children’s vocabulary develops slowly until around 18 
months and during this age, gestures and words (or sounds) are used in parallel (Volterra, 
Caselli, Capirci, & Pizzuto, 2005). There are large individual differences between children, 
but around 18 months many of them enter a period where new words are learned very rapidly. 
Children at this stage of language development can learn several new words every week, or 
even every day (Goldfield & Reznick, 1990). During this period, children start to use more 
words than gestures in their communicative production (Iverson, Capirci, & Caselli, 1994). 
 
When children learn more words, they also start to combine two or more words, for example, 
nouns and verbs into utterances, which typically happens around 18 months (Berglund, 1999). 
In the beginning these utterances are very simple and not concerned with rules of grammar, 
although the combination of words shows that some sort of understanding of semantic 
relations must be present already at this age (Flavell et al., 1993). While a two-year-old talks 
about things that are here and now, already by the age of three children are capable of 
constructing utterances about what happened somewhere else or yesterday. By this age a child 
has already acquired more than a thousand words. With this large vocabulary, most children, 
sometime past the age of three, enter a period where they adapt the rules of grammar very 
rapidly (Bates, Dale, & Thal, 1995) and by the age of four, an adult-like language is present.  
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Autism spectrum disorder 
Autism is a developmental disorder which was first identified in 1943 by Leo Kanner 
(Kanner, 1943). It is diagnosed in 5-20 out of 10 000 children and more often in boys than in 
girls (ratio about 3-5:1) (Frith, 1994; Gillberg, Cederlund, Lamberg, & Zeilon, 2006). The 
majority of autism cases are presumed to have genetic causes although the specific genetic 
marker is still unknown (Wing, 1997). Instead, the diagnosis is based on behavioural grounds 
and includes a triad of behavioural characteristics; impaired social interaction, problems with 
communication and restricted/stereotyped behaviour (Wing, 1997). One important aspect in 
autism is that it is a developmental disability, which means that it affects the child’s whole 
development and also changes through development (Frith, 1994), which means that the 
impairment can differ in the same individual over time (Wing, 1997). As the child develops, 
some symptoms of the impairment can disappear or be mitigated, while other areas that were 
not impaired early in childhood can be detected later in childhood and adolescence. The 
reason might be that the child learns from experience and develop strategies to handle some 
difficulties, for example to avoid certain situations. It is also possible that some impairments 
do not appear early in childhood simply because there has been no such demands on the child. 
For example, starting school leads to new cognitive and social demands on the child, and 
some impairment can only now become problematic.  
 
Main areas of disability 
The child needs to be affected in three areas in order to receive the diagnosis autism spectrum 
disorder according to the two major manuals used; the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10; WHO, 1992) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
IV; APA, 1994).  
 
First, the child needs to show impairment in social interaction with others. This might include 
a limited use of non-verbal gestures, such as joint attention and eye contact. Children with 
autism do not use eye contact in the same manner as typically developing children, that is, 
they do not use it as a part of social interaction. Even if a child with autism avoids eye 
contact, it does not mean the child is avoiding other people, it could instead be a sign of his 
inability to read intentions in others and to be aware of others consciousness (Frith, 1994). 
Impairments in social interaction can be manifested as a lesser interest in sharing attention 
with other people, something which is both common and rewarding for typical children 
(Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2001). As a consequence of their impairment in social and 
emotional sharing, children with autism often have problems with peers, such as making and 
keeping friends.  
 
Second, communication needs to be an area of difficulty. Many children diagnosed with 
autism do not develop a spoken language to such an extent that it is useful as a tool for social 
interaction (Gillberg, 1991), and children that do develop language still have problems with 
some aspects of communication. Problems with the pragmatic aspects of language are 
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common to all individuals with autism, regardless of intelligence or problems in other areas of 
language development (Frith, 1994). Not being able to understand the real meaning behind 
words makes normal conversation very difficult and children with autism tend to interpret 
every sentence literally, even if most sentences we use include much more information than 
the actual words that we use. It is also common in autism to have problems with pronouns and 
understanding the difference between here and there, characteristics that probably signal a 
wider problem with understanding the meaning of utterances and the intention of the sender 
(Frith, 1994). A lack of play behaviour, especially symbolic or pretend play, is also part of the 
communicative difficulties in autism. Children with autism are engaged in less play compared 
to typically developing children and they also play at a lower level than could be expected 
considering their mental level (Williams, 2003). 
 
The third area in the autism triad is restricted, repetitive interests and behaviours. One of the 
main areas of autism that Kanner described in his seminal paper (Kanner, 1943) was that 
these children wanted the world to remain the same over time. Children with autism show a 
resistance against change and are often involved in routines and rituals. One explanation for 
this can be that as children with autism find the world fragmented and confusing it becomes 
very important to them to gain control over those areas that are possible to control (Frith, 
1994). Problems with flexibility are expressed in different ways, for example in an abnormal 
fixation on one area of interest or particular parts of objects or in repetitive/stereotyped 
motoric behaviour (Wing, 1997). 
 
Psychological models of autism 
How is it possible to explain the primary deficit that could cause the triad of difficulties seen 
in autism? While it can be argued that this task is doomed to fail (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 
2006) many different hypotheses have been put forward in order to try to explain the cause of 
the whole spectrum of the disorder, while others seek to find the primary cause of a particular 
behaviour seen in autism. The focus of the present thesis is on social communication (joint 
attention) and deferred imitation, but other main models are also briefly presented. 
Intersubjectivity in autism 
It is possible that an early deficit in functions that endorse intersubjectivity has a strong affect 
on social development, which leads to the different social behaviours seen in autism. If the 
early dyadic interaction between the infant and caregiver is less present or show a different 
pattern, this can lead to a different social development, which makes triadic interaction, 
language acquisition and the understanding of mentalising very difficult to acquire 
(Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). Perhaps a limited or different cognitive, motivational or 
emotional function in infancy could explain the social limitations seen in older children with 
autism. 
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Autism is diagnosed after the infancy period, which makes it difficult to know if these 
children show atypical social behaviour as infants. Retrospective studies have been used 
where parents are asked to describe their child’s behaviour in infancy. However, this method 
is limited since it is difficult for parents to ignore the child’s present problems and the results 
might be affected by selective recall. In an attempt to overcome this limitation, studies (e.g. 
Osterling & Dawson, 1994) have taken advantage of the use of home video recording, which 
has provided new opportunities to analyse early social behaviour before the child is diagnosed 
with autism. These analyses have shown that by their first birthday children later diagnosed 
with autism show less social responsiveness and joint attention, they look less at other 
people’s faces and they point less compared to typically developing infants (Osterling & 
Dawson, 1994). However, these studies analyse behaviour by the first birthday and do not 
give us information about infant behaviour before that age. 
 
Another way of capturing infant behaviour in children with autism is to conduct population 
scanning studies and analyse infant behaviour in those children later diagnosed with autism 
compared to children with typical development. Early scanning instruments (e.g. the 
CHecklist for Autism in Toddlers (CHAT)) have been used with high-risk populations, i.e. 
infants who have an older sibling with an autism diagnosis (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000). 
Studies using the CHAT have shown that some children with autism can be identified already 
in their second year. Factors included in the CHAT that predict a risk for a later autism 
diagnosis are limited or absent joint attention and pretend play (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000). 
Imitation 
Imitation is an important tool in infancy for connecting to other people, understanding 
communication and for social learning. Infants only a few hours old have the ability to imitate 
others (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983), suggesting an innate imitation-capacity in humans. Since 
imitation seems to be such a powerful behaviour in typical development, imitation in autism 
has been widely investigated and, by some, suggested to play an important part in trying to 
explain the deficits in autism (Rogers, Hepburn, Stackhouse, & Wehner, 2003). Imitation is 
not absent in autism, but when comparing children with autism to matched controls, children 
with autism often imitate less (Rogers et al., 2003). Imitation performance in autism depends 
on the type of action, the developmental level of the child, the severity of autism symptoms, 
the child’s social responsiveness and initiating joint attention behaviours (Rogers et al., 2003). 
The large individual differences in imitation in autism can also predict later development. In 
the Rogers et al. study, the child’s imitative ability at age three was a an important predictor 
for later development at age four, showing that children with good imitation skills showed 
more progress in both nonverbal and verbal skills. This could suggest that a deficit in 
imitation leads to less progress or that imitation is related to poorer cognitive development 
over time.  
 
Another aspect of imitation that has been investigated in autism is the ability to recognise that 
you are being imitated. Several studies (e.g. Field, Field, Sanders, & Nadel, 2001; Heimann, 
Laberg, & Nordøen, 2006; Nadel, 2002) have shown that children with autism benefit from 
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imitative interaction. If an adult or peer interacts with the child through imitation, i.e. imitate 
the actions, sounds and behaviours of the child, social behaviours and interest in others 
increase for the child with autism (Field et al., 2001). It has been suggested that being 
imitated develops social expectancies from others, leading to increased social behaviours in 
children with autism. The benefits of imitation can also depend on the kind of interaction 
created in an imitation situation. Imitation requires that the adult is totally attentive to the 
child and responds to everything the child does, which creates a close, reciprocal interaction. 
It has also been suggested that imitative interaction makes it possible for children with autism 
to recognize and understand the behaviour of the other person (Field et al., 2001). 
 
The importance of imitation in development has been supported by recent neurological 
research. About ten years ago, a special kind of neurons, called mirror neurons, was 
discovered in macaque monkeys. The same neurons were activated when the monkey either 
performed an action or saw the action performed by someone else, e.g. when grasping a piece 
of food or when seeing someone else grasping a piece of food (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996). This discovery suggests that the power of imitative learning might have a 
neurophysical explanation.  
Joint attention 
A general deficit in joint attention abilities has been suggested as an explanation for the 
difficulties in social interaction and communication seen in autism. Research on joint 
attention in autism, however, has shown that not all joint attention behaviours are equally 
difficult for children with autism. Declarative gestures, such as pointing to share interest, are 
less common, and perhaps more difficult, compared to imperative gestures that serve more 
instrumental purposes, such as requesting a toy (Carpenter et al., 2002). It has been argued 
that declarative gestures serve social functions to a higher degree than imperative gestures, 
and that children with autism have more difficulties in producing gestures that are used to 
direct others’ attention compared to directing others’ behaviour. Sharing attention is more 
dependent on an understanding of others mental states as compared to, for example, a 
requesting gesture, where you only need to understand and interpret others’ behaviour. It has 
also been suggested that children with autism have specific problems with declarative 
gestures that are initiated by themselves. The reason is that these episodes both involve a 
sharing of inner mental states and are motivated by the positive value this social sharing has 
for young children (Mundy & Sigman, 2006). One suggestion is that the motivational system 
that is required in dyadic interaction is also causing the impairment in triadic interaction such 
as joint attention (Mundy & Acra, 2006). This view is supported by results showing an 
especially robust impairment in initiating declarative joint attention (Mundy, Sigman, & 
Kasari, 1994; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999).  
 
The relation between joint attention abilities and language acquisition in autism has been 
shown in several studies (e.g. Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990) and it is possible that a 
limited interest in, and ability for, joint attention can explain part of the language delay in 
autism. This relation can probably be explained both on a cognitive developmental, 
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instrumental, and motivational level. That is, the relation between joint attention and language 
can depend on a similar underlying ability (such as intentional understanding) but it could 
also be the case that a joint attention deficit leads to reduced opportunities to participate in 
social interaction and that this lack of experience is responsible for the lower language level. 
Children often learn language in episodes of shared attention and if these episodes are limited 
or even absent, many learning opportunities get lost or become more ineffective (Frith, 1994). 
This could also help to explain the relation between joint attention and later theory of mind; 
both areas might depend on the same underlying ability but research (Hughes et al., 2005) 
additionally suggests that social influence is responsible for, at least part of, the development 
of theory of mind. Environmental variables such as maternal speech, number of siblings and 
peer influence are important for the development of theory of mind, suggesting multiple 
reasons for its development. 
Other main psychological models of autism 
Central coherence 
Typically, we have a propensity to create coherence and when we process information we do 
it to extract meaning. New experiences do not exist as fragmented entities within us, but are 
instead placed in a context in order for us to make sense of them. A strong central coherence 
implies that we see and seek the “whole picture“ at the expense of details. A weak central 
coherence means that the cognitive drive to attend to the whole instead of the parts is lacking. 
Children with autism have been suggested to have a weak central coherence and it has also 
been suggested that this can explain much of the behaviours seen in autism (Happé, 1999). 
The idea of a weak central coherence came from results showing that children with autism do 
very well on tasks that require the ability to detect details in large pictures, or create patterns 
of single units (Frith, 1994). The theory of weak central coherence also suggests an 
explanation why children with autism seem to have an interest in things that typical children 
barely notice. All information that we receive is judged by us as being either relevant or not. 
Most information is not relevant, which means that we simply ignore it. Information that is 
judged as relevant is that which is meaningful to us. However, if you lack the ability to judge 
what is meaningful, you might instead focus on some odd detail and lose the overall meaning 
(Frith, 1994). Today the ambition of the weak central coherence theory is no longer to explain 
the whole spectrum of autism disorder, but is instead suggested to explain part of the 
cognitive impairment (Happé & Frith, 2006). 
Executive functions 
Executive functions include cognitive skills such as problem solving, working memory, 
flexibility and planning (Zelazo & Müller, 2004). Different tests are used to tap different 
aspects of executive function and several studies have found that people with autism show 
poor performance on many such tasks, and an executive dysfunction have been suggested as 
the cause of the symptoms seen in autism (e.g. Ozonoff, South, & Provencal, 2005). This 
model fits well with the flexibility difficulties seen in autism, but has also been suggested to 
explain social and communicative disabilities as well (Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 
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1996). However, children with autism are not impaired on all executive function tasks (Zelazo 
& Müller, 2004) and the performance depends on the child’s mental level (Griffith, 
Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999; Ozonoff et al., 2005), as well as language level 
(Ozonoff et al., 2005). A recent study (Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006) found 
that only 50% of the children with autism had difficulties in the performance on tasks of 
executive function, questioning the universality of an executive dysfunction in autism. The 
uniqueness has also been questioned since other groups (such as ADHD and Tourette’s 
syndrome) also show executive function problems (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). 
Theory of mind 
An impaired theory of mind has also been suggested to underlie the symptoms of autism. 
Theory of mind is the ability to understand mental states in oneself and in others, and also the 
ability to use this understanding in the interpretation of one’s own and other’s behaviour 
(Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000). Children with autism show a lower 
performance on theory of mind tests compared to children with developmental delays, when 
the groups are matched on language age. However, tests of other, similar, causal relationships 
that do not include mental representations are typically mastered by children with autism 
(Frith, 1994). This has led to the assumption that children with autism interpret behaviour and 
not the intentions behind the behaviour. A specific deficit seems to be present in the ability to 
understand that others’ thoughts differ from their own, but it is not all children that fail these 
tests (Happé, 1994). Instead, high-functioning individuals with autism often do very well on 
theory of mind tests, but still find it difficult to understand others intentions and beliefs in real 
life (Klin & Volkmar, 1997). Critics of the theory of mind hypothesis (e.g. Happé, 1995) 
argue that these tests can be learned on a cognitive level, and solved as a logical problem, 
without much understanding of the social aspects. The important relation between success on 
theory of mind tasks and verbal ability suggests that the success is a result of high intelligence 
and verbal ability, more than a genuine understanding of other persons’ inner mental states 
(Happé, 1995). There are also different suggestions regarding how children develop a theory 
of mind, which have implications on the theory of mind hypothesis in autism. Some argue 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995b) that a specific theory of mind module exists and that this module 
could be affected in autism, while others argue (e.g. Tomasello, 1995) that theory of mind is 
only one step on the path of children’s social development and that the theory of mind 
problem is a result of other, more basic, social problems. 
 
Memory development 
Some results suggest that individuals with autism have problems with declarative memory 
performance, but the results depend on what kind of information that should be remembered, 
how that information has been organised and in what context it has been presented (Renner, 
Klinger, & Klinger, 2000; Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 2006), which entails that it might 
not be a memory problem per se. For example, tests where individuals are asked to remember 
a list of words is typically more difficult if the words are unrelated than if they can be 
thematically composed or could be read as a sentence (Williams et al., 2006). However, 
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individuals with autism do not seem to benefit to the same extent from these cues and instead 
remember the words as single words, without considering the context (Tager-Flusberg, 1991). 
 
Working memory has been of particular interest since it is part of the suggested executive 
dysfunction in autism. Working memory is defined as the ability to hold information on line 
and use that on line information to guide your behaviour. However, studies of working 
memory in individuals with autism have revealed mixed results (Bennetto et al., 1996; 
Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001), partly depending on which task that is used. It has therefore been 
suggested that individuals with autism pass working memory tests if they do not involve 
complex cognitive processes. That is, the complexity of the working memory task, and not the 
memory demand, decides if the task is manageable or not (Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, & 
Minshew, 2005). 
Deferred imitation 
As in infancy research, studying memory in autism is difficult since many memory tasks rely 
on other abilities as well, and declarative memory tests often rely on a verbal ability. To 
overcome this problem, the same nonverbal tasks that are being used with infants, such as 
deferred imitation, could also be beneficial to use in autism research. However, most research 
on recall memory that has used the deferred imitation paradigm has focused on how early 
infants can manage this task and how this ability develops (Jones & Herbert, 2006), less 
research has focused on atypical development, such as autism. 
  
Deferred imitation in autism has generated limited investigation, and has mostly been studied 
in relation to immediate imitation (for review see; Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004) and not 
in relation to other memory tasks. Two studies have shown reduced performance on deferred 
imitation in children with autism compared to typically developing children (Dawson, 
Meltzoff, Osterling, & Rinaldi, 1998; Whiten & Brown, 1998) and one study has shown 
unimpaired performance (McDonough, Stahmer, Schreibman, & Thompson, 1997). The 
relation between deferred imitation and language has been investigated in one study of 
children with autism (Toth, Munson, Meltzoff, & Dawson, 2006) revealing a relation between 
immediate imitation and concurrent language ability at 3-4 years, and a relation between 
deferred imitation and the rate of language acquisition.  
 
Even if deferred imitation is a test of recall memory that does not require the use of language, 
it still depends on other abilities apart from memory. The child does not only need to 
remember the action seen earlier, he/she also needs to be motivated to imitate that action. 
While it can be argued that all imitation has a social element to it, the imitation of actions 
with objects probably entails less social demands compared to the imitation of body 
movements or facial gestures, and this might limit the social affect on performance on 
deferred imitation tasks. Since deferred imitation probably is even more important than 
immediate imitation for social learning (since the child rarely has the opportunity to imitate 
immediately in real life situations), deferred imitation could be regarded as especially 
important in autism, because children with autism are limited in other areas connected with 
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social learning, such as joint attention. There are also similarities between deferred imitation 
and joint attention tasks; both involve a triadic interaction between two persons and an object 
of mutual interest and attention (Jones & Herbert, 2006).  
 
Play 
The social interaction impairment in autism often has a severe impact on peer relations and 
friendships. Problems with interaction and communication affects the play competence in 
children with autism, but less engagement in play might also affect social development, since 
the child is given less opportunities to practice social roles and relationships (Travis & 
Sigman, 1998). Play development in children with autism is not only delayed but also shows a 
deviant pattern (Peeters, 1998). The interest in object manipulation seen in early infancy is 
less present in children with autism. Instead of investigating and exploring the possible use of 
objects, children with autism are more repetitive in their manipulation. In functional play, 
children with autism are more likely to use toys in a non-functional way, for example turning 
a car upside down and spinning the wheels instead of driving it (for a review see; Williams, 
2003). Even if children with autism show an overall play impairment, they also have specific 
problems with play that include pretence, symbols and imagination, which is also included in 
the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (APA, 1994). 
Pretend play 
Numerous studies have shown that children with autism have an impairment in pretend play 
even when their language level has been considered (for reviews see; Jarrold, 2003; Jarrold et 
al., 1993). This impairment, however, is far from absolute and some children with an autism 
diagnosis do engage in pretend play and many of the children perform pretend play under 
certain conditions. First, the difficulties with pretend play in autism seem to be a problem 
mainly with spontaneous play. When asked to pretend, children with autism perform as well 
as typically developing children (e.g. Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1997). Second, children with 
autism can also understand pretend play in others (Kavanaugh & Harris, 1994) and 
intervention studies show that pretend play can be learned (Stahmer, 1995). 
 
The metarepresentational theory fits well with the combined impairment in both pretend play 
and theory of mind that is present in autism (Leslie, 1987). According to this theory, the 
ability to represent both a real and an unreal event at the same time underlies both abilities 
and thus explains why both are problematic in autism. However, the metarepresentational 
theory cannot explain why children with autism actually do understand and produce some 
pretend play (Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith, & Boucher, 1994), like under prompted conditions. 
It has instead been suggested that the pretend play impairment might be a problem with 
motivation; that children with autism choose not to pretend, even if they have the ability 
(Harris, 1989; Jarrold, 2003). This view has, in turn, been criticised because it can be argued 
that elicited or prompted pretend play does not involve symbolic understanding and should 
not be considered “real” pretend play. Instead, prompted pretend play could index imitation of 
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others’ actions or it could be a measure of the child’s ability to guess the most correct 
behaviour, when he/ she is asked to produce a pretended act (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 
1997). If this proves to be true, different explanations are needed for spontaneous and elicited 
pretend play. 
 
Others (e.g. Harris, 1991) argue that pretend play and theory of mind does not require a 
metarepresentational ability. To understand false belief the child needs to simulate, or imagine 
how certain beliefs would ensue a certain behaviour or emotion and also be able to imagine 
how the same belief would make other people behave or feel. The link between pretend play 
and theory of mind in autism could be explained by a general simulation deficit and this 
theory could also explain why some pretend play is understood by children with autism, since 
not all forms of pretending require mental simulation (Harris, 1989).  
 
Lack of pretend play has also been suggested to depend on the social deficit in autism (Jarrold 
et al., 1993). Pretend play requires an understanding of shared meaning and others’ intentions, 
which is learned in interaction with other people. If the children find it difficult to create and 
engage in social relations, their pretend play would consequently be affected (e.g. Hobson, 
2004). This is further supported by research showing that lower functioning children with 
autism are more impaired in pretend play, even when considering their lower mental age, 
compared to higher functioning children, perhaps because low functioning children are less 
able to engage in, and learn from, social interaction with others (Stanley & Konstantareas, 
2007).  
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SUMMARY OF STUDIES 
General and specific aims 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate individual differences in early social abilities 
and memory, and how they relate to later or concurrent language and cognition. This was 
done in study I and II by investigating memory abilities and social communication as 
predictors to early language acquisition and later cognitive ability in typically developing 
infants. In study III and IV the relation between recall memory/deferred imitation ability and 
social communication, together with pretend play and child-parent interaction, were 
investigated in relation to language age in a group of children with autism spectrum disorder 
and compared with typically developing children. 
Study I 
Early abilities in visual recognition memory and social communication have been shown to 
relate to language in several studies (e.g. Bornstein & Sigman, 1986; Mundy & Gomes, 
1998). The same relation between language competence and early recall memory, as 
measured with deferred imitation, has not yet been investigated. The aim of study I was to 
explore if nonverbal recall memory, together with visual recognition memory and social 
communication, was related to early language acquisition. We expected all three infancy 
measures to be related to early language acquisition and further that they would tap 
differential cognitive abilities and thus give unique contributions to the prediction of 
language.    
Study II 
Study II was a follow-up study of the children in study I. The first aim was to investigate if 
the measures of early recall memory and social communication in the infancy period from 
study I were related to later language and cognition, when the children had reached 4 years. 
Such long-term predictions have been made of other early memory abilities but not of recall 
memory measured with deferred imitation. The second aim was to investigate if recall 
memory and social communication had a unique relation to later development and if they 
gave a better prediction if they were used in combined analyses as compared to being 
analysed separately. 
Study III 
In study III the aim was to investigate the same measures as in study I and II, i.e. deferred 
imitation and social communication, in a group of children diagnosed with autism spectrum 
disorder. The relation between deferred imitation, social communication and language level 
was investigated in a group of children with autism and then compared to a language-age-
matched group of children with typical development. Whereas social communication is 
known to be affected in autism and also related to language acquisition in this group, deferred 
imitation has not been investigated to the same extent. We expected social communication 
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and deferred imitation to be less present in children who were judged to have a lower 
language level, and that this would be more pronounced in children with autism compared to 
typically developing children.  
Study IV 
In study IV the focus was on individual differences in pretend play and parents’ verbal 
comments during play, and also how these two variables relate to deferred imitation and 
social communication in children with autism and children with typical development. Based 
on previous research, we expected pretend play to be reduced in children with autism 
compared to typically developing children, but also in children with a lower language level, 
compared to children with a higher language level within both groups. We further expected 
parents’ comments to differ as a function of the language level of the child. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Study I and II 
The same group of children participated in study I and II. Thirty children (17 girls) were 
observed three times during infancy. Their mean birth weight was 3755 grams, with a mean 
Apgar score of 9.8 and a mean gestational age of 40.2 weeks. All children had a normal birth 
and no known disabilities. The first observation during the infancy period was carried out 
when the children were approximately 6 months (M = 26.7 weeks, SD = 1.4), the second 
observation around 9-10 months (M = 40.7 weeks, SD = 1.3) and the third observation at 14-
15 months (M = 62.5 weeks, SD = 2.9). Twenty-six children (16 girls) were observed again 
around their fourth birthday (M = 50.4 months, SD = 1.5).  
 
Some data were lost during each observation (Table 1). During the first observation at 6 
months, the data on visual recognition memory were lost for three children. At nine months, 
the data on the same test were lost for 6 children and one child did not complete the deferred 
imitation test. At 14 months, the information about language and communication was 
incomplete for three children. In the follow-up observation at four years, 26 of the children 
were able to participate. The data loss at the last observation was due to the fact that families 
had either moved or chosen not to participate. 
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Table 1. Data loss at the different observations 
 6 months  9 months  14 months  50 months 
 FTII1  FTII1 DI2  DI2 ESCS3 SECDI4  McCarthy5 
1 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
2 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
3 –  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
4 √  √ √  √ √ –  – 
5 √  – √  √ √ –  √ 
6 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
7 √  √ √  √ √ –  – 
8 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
9 √  – √  √ √ √  √ 
10 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
11 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
12 √  √ √  √ √ √  – 
13 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
14 –  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
15 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
16 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
17 –  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
18 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
19 √  – –  √ √ √  – 
20 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
21 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
22 √  – √  √ √ √  √ 
23 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
24 √  – √  √ √ √  √ 
25 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
26 √  – √  √ √ √  √ 
27 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
28 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
29 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
30 √  √ √  √ √ √  √ 
1
 Fagan Test of Infant Abilities, 2 Deferred imitation, 3 Early Social Communication Scales, 4 Swedish Early 
Communicative Development Inventories, 5 McCarthy Scales of Children Abilities 
Study III and IV 
Twenty children diagnosed with autism according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994) (18 boys 
and 2 girls) and 23 children with typical development (12 boys and 11 girls) participated in 
study III and IV. Chronological, language and mental age for the groups is listed in Table 2. 
Fifteen of the children with autism were diagnosed at the Child Neuropsychiatry Clinic 
(Sahlgrenska University Hospital), four were diagnosed by another neuropsychiatric team in 
northern Göteborg and one child was diagnosed by a paediatrician. The typically developing 
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children were recruited from day-care centres in Göteborg. The children with autism and the 
typically developing children were matched for language age at group level. There was no 
significant difference in mental age between the groups (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Descriptive data for the groups in study II and IV. Means (SD). 
 Autism Typical p  1 
 (N = 20) (N = 23)  
Chronological age 66.8 (17.32) 35.0 (5.37) < .001 
Language age 29.7 (15.99) 35.6 (13.17) ns 
Mental age 45.2 (19.36) 2 37.5 (9.16) ns 
1
 t-test 
2
 N = 19 due to data loss  
Estimated language age 
Three tests were used in a hierarchic fashion for the estimation of language age in the autism 
group. Nine children took the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) (Dunn & Dunn, 
1997). This is a test of receptive language, which requires the child to point repeatedly at one 
out of four pictures. For eight children a parental report, the Swedish Early Communicative 
Development Inventories (SECDI), was used (Berglund & Eriksson, 2000; Eriksson & 
Berglund, 1999). For three children, who refused to comply or could not concentrate when 
assessed by the PPVT and who reached ceiling effect on the SECDI, language age was 
estimated by use of the expressive vocabulary part of Kaufmann (Kaufman & Kaufman, 
1983). 
 
The PPVT was used to estimate language age for 22 of the children with typical development. 
One child was assessed with the Kaufman as he refused to cooperate on the PPVT. 
Estimating Mental Age  
As part of the clinical assessment the Griffiths II test (Ahlin-Åkerman & Norberg, 1991; 
Griffiths, 1970) or the WPPSI (Wechsler, 1999) was administered when estimating mental 
age for 15 of the children with autism. For four children, the Raven’s Coloured Matrices 
(Raven, 1976) were used, and one child with autism was not tested.  
 
The children with typical development were assessed using the McCarthy Scales of 
Children’s Abilities (McCarthy, 1972). The General Cognitive Index was used to calculate the 
mental age of participants in this group.  
Procedure and measures 
Study I 
All children came to the department on three different occasions, each time in the company of 
a parent. The children were observed in a sparsely furnished room with video cameras, placed 
in two corners, that could be manipulated from a different room. 
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Deferred imitation (Recall memory) 
During the 9- and 14-month observation, deferred imitation was used as a measure of recall 
memory. The procedure was adapted from Meltzoff (1988a; 1988b) and the same objects and 
actions were used. Each action was demonstrated three times during a 20 sec period. The 
children were not allowed to touch the objects during, or after, the demonstration, ensuring 
that the memory of the action seen was based on a representation and not a motor experience. 
After the demonstration a delay was imposed, and after the delay the participants were 
presented with the toys, one by one, to see if they would produce the target acts they had been 
shown. During this procedure the children were also videotaped. 
 
At 9 months the children saw three different objects being manipulated by the experimenter. 
The first object consisted of two wooden rectangles connected with a hinge, and the action 
was to fold the two rectangles together. The second object was a black box with a black 
button hidden on top, and the action was to press the button, which produced a beeping sound. 
The third object was a plastic egg that produced a rattling sound when shaken, and shaking 
the egg was the target action. A memory delay of 8 to 10 min was imposed after the 
demonstration (M = 8.2 min; SD = 2.7; range: 5.7 – 17.5). 
 
At 14 months, three different objects were used. The first object was a pull toy that consisted 
of two wooden cubes with plastic tubes extending from them. One tube was slightly narrower 
and fit inside the other, and the action was to pull them apart. The second object was a 
collapsible cup and the action was to show the cup in its unfolded position and then to press it 
down so it would close. The third action used two objects: one empty plastic cup and a string 
of beads, and the action was to pick up the beads and lower them into the plastic cup. The 
memory delay was approximately 12 min (M = 12.7 min; SD = 2.3; range 9.8 – 18.5). 
 
Two research assistants coded the deferred imitation tasks independent of each other, and the 
agreement between them was assessed by Cohen’s kappa and yielded .85 at 9 months and .89 
at 14 months. 
Recognition memory 
At the 6- and 9-month observation, the Fagan Test of Infant Intelligence (FTII) (Fagan & 
Detterman, 1992), which is used as a measure of recognition memory and information 
processing, was administered. The FTII is a paired-comparison test of visual novelty 
preference and the child sits in front of a computer screen that shows pictures of different 
faces. When a picture has been assimilated by the child it is paired with a novel picture. Ten 
of these problems are shown to the children at each age and the primary score given is a 
novelty score, showing the percentage of time that the child spends looking at novel pictures 
as compared to familiar pictures. This novelty score is used as a measure of the child’s visual 
recognition memory. 
  35 
Social communication 
The Early Social Communication Scales (ESCS) (Mundy, Hogan, & Doehring, 1996) was 
administered at 14 months. This is a structured assessment method where an experimenter and 
a child sit at a table playing with different toys. The method is designed to capture different 
nonverbal social communication skills in children aged 8 to 30 months and takes 15-20 
minutes to complete. 
 
The ESCS measures three different areas of social communication: joint attention, requesting 
and social interaction (Mundy et al., 1996). For each of these areas, the child can either 
initiate a bid for attention or respond to a bid from the experimenter, creating a total of six 
scales. The variables used in study I were initiating joint attention, responding to joint 
attention and turn taking abilities (which are part of the initiating social interaction scale).  
 
The scoring system is based on frequencies of behaviours and ratio scores (Mundy et al., 
1996). The ESCS provides an opportunity to calculate a separate ratio score for high-level 
behaviours initiating joint attention. The items that are scored as low-level behaviours on this 
scale occur when the child makes eye contact with the experimenter while he/she at the same 
time is touching a toy or alternates between looking at an active toy and looking at the 
experimenter. High-level behaviours are scored when the child points to something before the 
experimenter points or shows a toy to the experimenter. A high-level ratio score was 
computed by dividing the frequency of high-level joint attention bids by the total frequency of 
joint attention bids. Ratio scores (dividing the number of correct responses with the total 
number of trials) were also calculated for responding to joint attention. Behaviours scored 
include occasions when the child follows the experimenter’s pointing, either to a picture in a 
book (6 trials) or to a poster on the wall (6 trials). Turn-taking is scored whenever the child 
initiates a turn-taking sequence with the experimenter. The child is given two different toys (a 
car and a ball) and is encouraged (with gestures) to roll the toy to the experimenter (obtaining 
a score of 0–2). 
 
Three different persons scored the tapes. Reliability was assessed by rescoring three randomly 
chosen tapes (10% of the sample) and the agreement between them was r = .94 for joint 
attention and r = .75 for social interaction (turn-taking). 
Language  
The child’s communicative skills were assessed at 14 months by using the Swedish Early 
Communicative Development Inventories (SECDI) (Eriksson & Berglund, 1999), which is a 
parental report. For this age group, the inventory “words and gestures” is the most 
appropriate. The parts of the inventory used in study I were “vocal comprehension” and 
“gestures produced”. 
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Study II 
All children came to the department and were observed in the same room as in study I. From 
study I, the measure of recall memory at 9 months and the measures from the ESCS at 14 
months were used in the analysis. The nonverbal communicative skills measured with the 
ESCS used in study II were joint attention (initiating and responding) and object requesting 
(initiating and responding). The variable joint attention was created by combining initiating 
and responding joint attention behaviours (see study I), and the same combination between 
initiating and responding to object requesting created the variable object requesting. 
 
Initiating object requesting is scored when the child makes eye contact with the experimenter 
when an active toy has stopped or disappeared, reaches for a toy, gives the experimenter a toy 
and points for request. For initiating object requesting, a high-level ratio score was calculated 
by dividing the frequency of high-level bids (giving and pointing) with the total number of 
bids. Responding to object requesting is scored when the child gives a toy to the experimenter 
after a request. The scoring agreement for this scale was r = .94 for initiating object requesting 
and r = .84 for responding to object requesting. 
Cognitive ability 
A general cognitive test was administered when the children were 4 years old; the McCarthy 
Scales of Children Abilities (McCarthy, 1972). This test consists of five different subscales: 
verbal, perceptual-performance, quantitative, memory and motor. All these subscales were 
used as well as the total score of all the subscales combined. 
Receptive language  
The children’s receptive language at 4 years was measured with Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT-III) (Dunn & Dunn, 1997).  
Study III 
All children came to the department twice, with one or two days between the visits. Each visit 
lasted approximately 1 – 1½ hour and each child was accompanied by at least one parent. The 
child was observed in the same room as in study I and II, and by the same experimenter on 
both occasions. 
Deferred imitation 
Deferred imitation was measured with actions on objects. Five of the objects and the same 
procedure as in study I and II were used (Meltzoff, 1988a, 1988b). For the egg, beads and 
collapsible cup, the same action was demonstrated and the same scoring was used. For the 
wooden rectangles, the experimenter used the elbow instead of the hand to fold them together 
and in the case of the black box, a pen, instead of the finger, was used to press the button. 
This slight change in procedure was made to include more unfamiliar behaviour, which was 
not the most practical or obvious way to reach the goal (the target action). 
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A research assistant together with another person coded all deferred imitation tasks 
independent of each other, and the observer agreement between them was assessed by 
Cohen’s kappa (κ = .89).  
Social communication 
The ESCS (Mundy et al., 1996) was administered for all children at the beginning of their 
first visit. All six scales were used in the analysis. A research assistant coded all of the ESCS 
data. A different assistant coded 10% of the observations selected on a random basis, and the 
overall agreement between them was assessed by Cohen’s kappa (κ = .76).  
Study IV 
The data in study IV were collected at the same visits as in study III and the measures of 
deferred imitation and social communication were the same. The ESCS scales used in the 
analysis were: initiating joint attention, high-level initiating joint attention and responding to 
joint attention. 
 
Pretend play and parents’ comments were assessed during a free play situation at the second 
visit where the child and one parent took part in a procedure adapted from Bloom (e.g. Bloom 
& Tinker, 2001). The play session was 24 minutes long and the experimenter interrupted the 
play twice (after 8 minutes and after 16 minutes) by entering the room, carrying with her 
additional toys. Only the last 8 minutes were coded and to ensure that this session was not 
affected by being last, the parent and child were not aware of how long the play session would 
continue or how many interruptions there would be.  
Pretend play 
Pretend play was defined as either object substitution (e.g. using a block as a car), adding a 
pretend property to a toy (e.g. the doll is hungry), pretending that something exists when it 
does not (e.g. there is a lion behind the curtain) or role-playing (e.g. the child pretends to be 
the mother) (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Leslie, 1987). Every time the child pretended according to 
these criteria, the duration of time the pretend play lasted was coded. 
 
An undergraduate student coded all play situations for duration of pretend play. A research 
assistant coded 6 of the 43 children, selected on a random basis, and the agreement was 
assessed by Cohen’s kappa (κ = .85). 
Parents’ verbal comments 
The parents’ verbal comments about objects or actions with objects were coded as one out of 
two categories, depending on the child’s focus of attention. Comments about an object or an 
action with an object that the child attended to were coded as a synchronized comment and 
was only noticed ones during an interval of 10 sec, even if it occurred several times. 
Comments about an object outside the child’s focus of attention were coded as an 
unsynchronized comment, and was only noticed ones during an interval of 5 sec, even if it 
occurred several times. The longer interval for synchronized compared to unsynchronized 
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comments was due to difficulty to obtain acceptable agreement between coders. Three parent-
child dyads (one in the autism group and two in the typical group) were excluded because the 
parents spoke a language unknown to the coder.  
 
A graduate student coded all play situations for synchronized and unsynchronized comments. 
A research assistant coded 6 of the 40 children, selected on a random basis, and the agreement 
was assessed by Cohen’s kappa (κ = .76) for both categories.  
 
Main results 
Study I 
Visual recognition memory, recall memory and social communication were all positively 
related to communicative competence at 14 months. More precisely, visual recognition 
memory at 6 months, recall memory at 9 months, initiating joint attention at 14 months and 
initiating turn-taking at 14 months had significant positive correlations with gestures 
produced at 14 months, while visual recognition memory at 6 months, recall memory at 14 
months and responding to joint attention at 14 months had, at least moderate, positive 
correlations with vocal comprehension at 14 months.  
 
Regression analyses were conducted in order to find possible predictions of language ability, 
and also to investigate if cognitive and social variables in infancy made unique or mutual 
contribution to outcome. The best regression model included visual recognition memory at 6 
months, recall memory at 9 months and turn-taking skills at 14 months, a model that 
explained 41% of the variance in gestures produced at 14 months. In this model, recall 
memory and turn-taking made significant contribution to gestural communication and of these 
two variables recall memory was the strongest. Such a strong regression model was not found 
when vocal comprehension was the outcome variable, the best model consisted of visual 
recognition memory at 6 months, recall memory at 14 months and responding to joint 
attention at 14 months. This model explained 29% of the variance in vocal comprehension 
with recall memory as the only significantly contributing variable.  
Study II 
The results revealed several significant positive correlations of social communicative skills at 
14 months to cognitive ability at 4 years. The strongest relationships between the outcome 4 
years and the results in infancy were noted for initiating joint attention and initiating object 
requesting. Multiple regression analysis did not succeed in explaining more of the variance 
than the variables did in separate correlations. 
 
The results from study II identified one group of children with specific problems on a 
cognitive test at 4 years. This was the group who scored below the mean on both recall 
memory measured at 9 months and joint attention measured at 14 months. This group had 
significantly lower scores on the total scale, as well as on the subscales of the on McCarthy 
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Scales of Children’s Abilities, when compared with the children who scored above mean on 
one or both of the infant measures.  
Study III 
Comparing the children with autism and the typically developing children revealed that 
children with autism showed a lower frequency on almost all social communicative measures, 
as well as on deferred imitation. 
 
To explore how these differences were dependent on language age, the participants were 
divided using a mean split of language age. Children who scored below the mean were 
defined as Low and children who scored above the mean were defined as High. By this 
dividing procedure, four groups were created, 1) autism – low language age, 2) autism – high 
language age, 3) typical development – low language age and 4) typical development – high 
language age.  Descriptive data of the subgroups are seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive data for the groups divided in high and low language age (LA). Means 
(SD).  
 Low LA High LA 
 
Autism  
(n = 10) 
Typical  
(n = 13) 
Autism  
(n = 10) 
Typical  
(n = 10) 
Chronological age 63.1 (20.7) 32.9 (4.4)** 70.5(13.1) 37.8 (5.4)** 
Language age 15.8 (3.9) 26.0 (5.6)** 43.5 (9.9) 48.1 (8.7) 
Mental age 32.8 (15.5) 1 33.8 (7.2) 56.4 (15.5) 42.4 (9.5)* 
1 
n = 9 
* p < .05 (t-test) 
** p < .01 (t-test) 
 
Comparing the two groups with a low language age showed a result very similar to the total 
group comparison, that is, children with autism performed at a significantly lower level 
compared to children with typical development both on social communicative measures and 
on deferred imitation. A different result was obtained when the high language age groups 
were compared; these groups performed on a similar level on all social communicative 
measures, except for initiating joint attention, which was still less frequent in children with 
autism. The result obtained on deferred imitation showed a lower result for the autism group 
in the high language age comparison. 
Study IV 
Study IV revealed that spontaneous pretend play was less present in children with autism 
compared to children with typical development. In addition, the children with autism that 
were engaged in pretend play had a significantly higher language age compared to the 
children with autism that did not show any pretend play. In order to investigate if pretend play 
differed as a function of the child’s language age the same dividing procedure as in study III 
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(see Table 3) was used in study IV. Children with autism judged to have a higher language 
age showed less pretend play compared to typically developing children, while no such 
difference was found when comparing children with autism and a lower language age to 
typically developing children. However, only two children with autism and low language age 
performed any pretend play. 
 
The results also showed that parents’ of children with autism used fewer synchronized 
comments compared to parents’ of typically developing children. Comparing parents’ 
comments in the groups with lower language age showed that parents of children with autism 
used less synchronized and more unsynchronized comments, compared to parents of children 
with typical development. No such difference was found in the high language age group 
comparison. Furthermore, the parents of children with autism and a low language age used the 
same amount of synchronized and unsynchronized comments in contrast to parents of 
children with autism and a high language age who used more synchronized comments. The 
same result came out for typically developing children, regardless of children’s language age 
their parents used more synchronized comments. 
 
Correlation analyses in the autism group revealed that pretend play was positively related to 
both deferred imitation and initiating joint attention. In the same group, parents’ synchronized 
comments were positively related to high-level initiating joint attention, while parents’ 
unsynchronized comments were negatively related to deferred imitation. 
 
Discussion 
Although the knowledge of early developing abilities in infants, and how early abilities 
predict later development, has grown dramatically over the past decades there are still many 
questions that remain to be answered. The general aim of the present thesis was to investigate 
individual differences in some early emerging abilities and how these relate to language and 
cognition. This was done by conducting a longitudinal study of typically developing infants 
and by a comparative study between children diagnosed with autism and children with typical 
development. The results contribute to previous knowledge about the development of 
language and cognition in childhood and point to some important predictors of later language 
and cognitive ability that can be found in infancy. The results also add to the understanding of 
language development in children with autism and how language development is related to 
individual differences in both social and cognitive abilities. 
 
There are a growing number of studies showing that deferred imitation is within the infant’s 
repertoire from the first year of life (e.g. Barr et al., 1996; Meltzoff, 1988b), which is much 
earlier than proposed by classic developmental theories. The ability to form mental 
representations and to store them in memory, as in the deferred imitation procedure, is 
regarded as important for social and cognitive development (Meltzoff, 1999; Piaget, 1952). 
However, few studies have explicitly investigated the predictive value of early deferred 
imitation for later development. The present thesis shows that individual differences in early 
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deferred imitation probably can be used to predict later development. Deferred imitation was 
related to early emerging language skills in typically developing infants, but also to cognitive 
development later in childhood. Such an important predictive value has previously been 
shown by joint attention and visual recognition memory in infancy (e.g. Mundy & Gomes, 
1998; Sigman et al., 1997), and this is also supported by the results in the present thesis. 
Study I and II, however, suggest that deferred imitation should be considered to be an equally 
important predictor. It is important to identify areas in early development that influence later 
development, for both clinical and theoretical reasons. Being able to identify children who are 
at risk of slower cognitive or language development improves the possibility of giving that 
child adequate support. The earlier this identification can be made, the better, which leads to 
the fact that it is especially valuable to identify tests that do not rely on verbal ability. From a 
theoretical point of view, developmental trajectories from early to later abilities help us 
understand how language is mastered, and how children develop their understanding of 
people around them. The results presented in the present thesis suggest that children who 
score low on tests of deferred imitation might be at risk of a slower cognitive development, 
but only when a low performance on deferred imitation was combined with a low 
performance on joint attention. In a deferred imitation test children observe the actions of 
another person, create a mental representation of that action, store it in memory and are later 
motivated to perform the action themselves. A reduced ability in deferred imitation probably 
shows a reduced capacity to learn from environment, which would affect the acquisition of 
language, as well as the child’s overall cognitive development. 
 
Deferred imitation is a measure of nonverbal recall memory and has revealed new insights 
into memory processes in infancy (Rovee-Collier et al., 2001). The fact that it relies on an 
ability to imitate has to be taken into consideration when investigating children with autism. 
Children with autism require, naturally, the same recall memory abilities as typically 
developing children in order to successfully perform imitation after a delay. However, 
imitation is less frequent in children with autism (Rogers & Pennington, 1991), and this might 
influence performance on the deferred imitation task, i.e. failure on a test of deferred imitation 
could depend on an imitation deficit rather than on the child’s memory capacity per se. Before 
more research on deferred imitation in autism is available, especially in relation to other 
memory tests, it would be difficult to assume that deferred imitation is a valid measure of an 
overall recall memory capacity in this population. Nonetheless, the results from the present 
thesis point to the importance of deferred imitation in children with autism as well. Deferred 
imitation was the only measure, apart from initiating joint attention, which was reduced in the 
autism group regardless of the child’s language level, which suggests a robust difficulty 
within this area of development. A relation between deferred imitation and pretend play was 
also evident in children with autism. Pretend play is suggested to rely on the ability to 
observe, remember, and imitate pretend acts of others (Rakoczy et al., 2005), implying that 
pretend play relies on the capacity for deferred imitation. The relation between these two 
areas shown in the present study might support the suggestion that pretend play is learned 
through the ability to imitate previously observed actions.  
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One aim of the longitudinal study was to investigate how combined variables in early 
development could increase the prediction of later development. This was observed when 
cognitive and social measures in infancy were combined, and two particular analyses 
supported this conclusion.  
 
First, the best prediction from infant measures to the production of gestures at 14 months was 
revealed when visual recognition memory, deferred imitation and turn-taking were used in a 
regression model. These variables explained more of the variance when combined than in 
separate correlations. Visual recognition memory was measured at 6 months, deferred 
imitation at 9 months and turn-taking at 14 months, which further suggest that different 
abilities are important at different ages, if we want to predict language development. It is 
possible that deferred imitation would capture somewhat different underlying processes 
depending on the age of the child that is tested. Deferred imitation performed at 9 and 14 
months yielded different relations to vocal and gestural communication. Deferred imitation at 
9 months contributed to the production of gestures at 14 months, while this measure had no 
relation to vocal comprehension at 14 months. The opposite relation was true for deferred 
imitation when measured at 14 months. This was also true for visual recognition memory, 
which was measured both at 6 and 9 months, but only the 6-month assessment showed any 
predictive relation to outcome, a result that is supported by previous research (McCall & 
Carriger, 1993). The results from both memory measures in study I suggest that the same 
procedure could tap different abilities depending on the age when it is assessed. Regarding 
visual recognition memory, very different results were obtained from the same test when it 
was used with an interval of three months. The reason for this is probably that it depends on 
the time of emergence for a specific ability, which means that the test is better at capturing 
individual differences in children at that particular age. The Fagan procedure is probably more 
challenging at 6 months as compared to 9 months, while deferred imitation might be optimal 
to use for infants at 9 months of age if the aim is to capture variance in memory performance. 
 
Second, the findings from study II revealed that scoring below the mean on both deferred 
imitation at 9 months and joint attention at 14 months yielded a lower result on a cognitive 
measure at 4 years, while scoring low on only one of the infant measures did not affect later 
performance in any negative way. This means that the combined low performance might 
capture something problematic in infancy that needs to be further investigated. It is possible 
that if a child has good skills in one area, this could compensate for the reduced performance 
in an other area. More serious problems are only evident if the child has reduced capacity in 
more areas than one. Interestingly, deferred imitation and initiating joint attention were the 
only variables that differed in the comparison between children with autism and children with 
typical development, in the groups that were judged to have a high language age (above 36 
months for the children with autism). That is, these variables did not improve with a higher 
language level, suggesting that they might be particularly important in the development of 
autism. Initiating joint attention has begun to receive special attention in relation to autism 
(Mundy & Sigman, 2006), and the result from this thesis suggests that deferred imitation in 
autism might deserve similar attention. However, a longitudinal approach is needed to find 
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out if this population is affected in cognitive development from a combined reduced 
performance in deferred imitation and joint attention, as noted in typically developing 
children in study II.  
 
The fact that many of the early developing abilities were related to each other, or made 
mutual predictions of language development, may speak against a modular theory of 
development. This theory suggests that areas as different as deferred imitation and social 
communication would develop as isolated entities, and also that language would develop as 
an independent module. The result from this thesis instead suggests a much more complex 
picture of development, in which language acquisition is dependent on many different areas, 
and that these areas also influence each other.   
 
Social communication and pretend play is assumed to be impaired in children with autism and 
is also part of the diagnostic criteria. Results from the comparative study (study III and IV) 
not only yielded large individual differences in children with autism, but also demonstrated 
that not all children show reduced (i.e. lower than typically developing children at same 
language age) performance in areas that are assumed to be generally affected. It was the 
children with a high language age who performed at the same level as typically developing 
children on tests of social communication, and the children with autism that performed 
pretend play had a higher language age than the children with autism who did not. Other areas 
that are seen as part of the autism diagnosis have also been shown to depend on the 
developmental level of the child. For example, theory of mind tasks are often mastered by 
children with autism if they have a high verbal ability (Happé, 1995). The present study 
shows a similar pattern for many social communicative measures, such as nonverbal 
requesting, responding to joint attention and pretend play.  
 
A different result was obtained for initiating joint attention and deferred imitation, where 
children with autism showed reduced performance regardless of language level. Compared to 
other social communicative gestures, initiating joint attention has been suggested to be 
especially difficult for children with autism (Mundy & Acra, 2006), a claim which is 
supported by our results. The results especially point to the importance of separating different 
forms of social communicative abilities. Joint attention could be more difficult for children 
with autism because it depends more on social motivation and sharing experiences compared 
to other communicative gestures. Sharing experiences with others involves a sharing of 
positive affect in typically developing children, but not among children with autism (Kasari, 
Sigman, Mundy, & Yirmiya, 1990). This could make joint attention more socially rewarding 
for typically developing children and could also explain why children with autism are less 
motivated to engage in joint attention (Mundy & Sigman, 2006). Furthermore, joint attention, 
in contrast to other social communicative skills, involves to a higher extent, a change of own 
and others’ minds. This means that joint attention gestures are not followed by any visible 
change in own or other people’s behaviour as is the case for other social communicative 
gestures, such as requesting (Gergely, 2004; Mundy et al., 1996). Joint attention might 
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therefore be especially difficult to learn and more dependent on social and intentional 
understanding, compared to other gestures.  
 
The specific difficulty in autism to initiate, in contrast to responding to, social 
communication, could also depend on an inner motivation to share experiences with others. In 
sharing social attention, initiating is a more active and spontaneous behaviour on the part of 
the child, whereas responding behaviours involve the ability to be aware of, and respond to, 
someone else’s social cues. To initiate and respond to social communication has also been 
suggested to reflect different underlying processes in typically developing children (e.g. 
Morales et al., 2000). This is supported by the results from study I, where initiating 
behaviours were related to the production of gestures, while responding behaviours were 
more related to vocal comprehension. For typically developing children at this age (14 
months), producing gestures is probably a more active form of communication compared to 
vocal comprehension. Further support for this assumption was obtained from study II were 
initiating joint attention and initiating object requesting was positively related to later 
cognitive and language development, whereas responding to the bids of others, was not. 
However, it is possible that initiating behaviours are the best measure to use at this age (14 
months) and that responding behaviours would have shown a better prediction had we 
investigated a different age-group.  
 
The above arguments for the specific difficulty in autism for joint attention, are consistent 
with simulation theory (e.g. Harris, 1989). According to this theory, children with autism have 
problems with simulating others’ mental states, not their behaviour. The consequence should 
be that gestures used to change another person’s actions would not be as difficult as gestures 
used to change another person’s mental state. This is also consistent with the theory-theory, 
which suggests a similar failure for children with autism to connect their own minds with the 
minds of others’ (e.g. Gopnik, Capps, & Meltzoff, 2000). Theory-theory additionally suggests 
that children with autism fail to attribute the mental states in others to the mental states of 
themselves. Simulation theory would argue that difficulties with joint attention in autism 
could be explained solely by their problem with simulation from self to other. However, this 
means that simulation theory does not explain why responding to joint attention is less 
difficult than initiating joint attention. If understanding ones’ own intentions come first and 
understanding others’ intentions follows through a simulation process, understanding others’ 
gestures (to follow pointing and gaze) would be more difficult than understanding and using 
such gestures oneself. 
 
To estimate language age in children with autism is difficult, and the language profile might 
look different compared to that of typically developing children. As an example the 
production of language often surpasses language comprehension. As is often the case, the 
children in this study were heterogenic in terms of language. As a consequence, different 
language tests were used for different children in order to estimate language age, and these 
tests partly tapped into different areas of language development. The ambition was to use a 
test of receptive language in the estimation of language age for all children. However, this test 
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turned out to be too difficult for some children, and others had difficulties with the test 
procedure. In addition, a parental report was used, which tapped the child’s comprehension, 
or comprehension and production, of words. This parental report was possible to use for 
children with a language age below 28 months, which means that an additional test was used 
for the children who did not complete the receptive language test and had a language level 
above 28 months. The use of different language tests to estimate language age in the group of 
children with autism is a serious limitation to the interpretations of the results, and the 
language age of the children must be considered with caution. However, we believe that the 
group division probably can be considered with more certainty. If the original test was too 
demanding, the child was assessed with the parental report and ended up in the low language 
age group. It should be noted that, if the original test was not completed for reasons other than 
language demands, that child would reach ceiling effects on the parental report and would 
thus be assessed by use of the third test, and consequently end up in the high language age 
group.  
 
The importance of joint attention and interaction in early development has been shown in 
several studies (e.g. Mundy et al., 1994; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). Most studies have 
focused on how the social ability and behaviour of the child contributes to later language or 
cognitive development, but interaction always comprises, and is created by, more than one 
person. The results from study IV point to the complexity of joint attention and especially its 
dependence on both parties in the interaction and how it should be considered bidirectional. 
Study IV showed that parents’ use of synchronized comments helps to create opportunities for 
episodes of joint attention. Since creating joint attention episodes is problematic for many 
children with autism, this group might be especially dependent on the behaviours of the 
parent. When a parent is labelling an object outside the child’s focus, the child needs to 
redirect her/his attention to the adult in order to establish joint attention. If a parent instead 
labels an object that the child is already attending to, redirecting attention is not required for 
joint attention. The children in this study seem to have taken advantage of a parent who is 
good at creating episodes of shared attention since parents’ synchronized comments was 
related to the use of more mature joint attention behaviours.  
 
The above relation was only evident in children with autism, which suggests that parents’ 
interaction style is influenced by the behaviour of the child they are interacting with. In the 
same way as an unresponsive mother (e.g. due to depression) has a significant impact on the 
child’s behaviour and development in early infant-mother interaction (e.g. Field et al., 2006), 
an infant that is not responding to the mother probably affects her behaviour as well. This 
means that children with autism are affected both by their own problems with interaction and 
the fact that they themselves affect their environment in such a way that the quality of the 
interaction might not be optimal for their social development. Results from study IV showed 
that parents of children with autism overall used fewer synchronized comments compared to 
parents of children with typical development. Especially the parents’ of children with autism 
who had a low language age differed from the rest; they used the same amount of 
unsynchronized and synchronized comments during play, a pattern that was not evident in any 
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other subgroup, where parents’ instead used more synchronized than unsynchronized 
comments. This supports the idea that children with autism, especially those with a low 
language level, affect their environment and might create an interaction pattern that includes 
fewer episodes of joint attention.  
 
It is a challenging task to try and find out how different abilities varies and co-varies 
throughout development, and if, and how, early abilities will affect later development. All 
children are born with individual strengths and weaknesses, and they are also born into a 
specific culture and family at a specific time in history. Different aspects, within the child 
him- or herself, as well as within the environment, constantly influence each other throughout 
development, and trying to isolate specific areas and control variables in such a dynamic 
structure as human development, is difficult. However, this is done by trying to control as 
many of these different aspects as possible. One way of investigating how specific abilities 
affect different aspects is to study children that show reduced abilities, and see how they 
differ in their development from unaffected children. One such group is children with autism, 
who by their, in many ways, unique pattern of strengths and weaknesses have revealed 
invaluable insights into the complexity of human development. The growing understanding of 
how typical children develop might also help us understand the specific impairments in 
autism. Hopefully the present thesis will contribute to this understanding. 
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